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INTRODUCTION 
How can I convey to you the disgust which your name awakens in 
me? The merger with Warner was a catastrophe. But the hitherto 
unimagined stupidity, the blind arrogance of your deal with Case 
simply beggars description. How can you face yourself knowing 
how much history, value and savings you have thrown away on 
your mad, ignorant attempt to merge with a wretched dial-up ISP? I 
don’t know what advice you have to offer, but I have some for you. 
Buy some rope, go out the back, find a tree and hang yourself. If 
you had any honor you would. 
—e-mail from Robert Hughes, Time magazine art critic, to Gerald 
Levin, AOL Time Warner CEO, 20021 
Employees present a curious puzzle for corporate law. On the one 
hand, employees are central to every business. The success of a 
corporation depends on its employees, from the chief executive officer 
down to the front-line production or service worker. But, for the most part, 
corporate law relegates employees to the sidelines. The players in 
corporate-law dramas are management, directors, and shareholders. The 
tension between shareholders and management is the focal point of 
corporate scholarship.2 Employees have no role in corporate governance. 
 
 
 1. KARA SWISHER, THERE MUST BE A PONY IN HERE SOMEWHERE: THE AOL TIME WARNER 
DEBACLE AND THE QUEST FOR A DIGITAL FUTURE 200 (2003). 
 2. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (“We 
focus in this Article on the behavioral implications of the property rights specified in the contracts 
between the owners and managers of the firm.”); David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and 
the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1993) (“Managerial accountability 
to shareholders is corporate law’s central problem.”). Cf. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, 
Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
1619, 1624 (2001) (“It was as if everyone already knew (from Berle and Means) that the master 
problem of corporate law was agency costs, and along came an economic model and a vocabulary to 
elaborate that view.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/4
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Perhaps nowhere is this contrast as dramatic as in the realm of mergers, 
acquisitions, and other transformative transactions. Such transactions are 
generally negotiated at the highest levels of management, approved by the 
board, and then announced to great fanfare.3 Shareholders have the power 
to vote on most large-scale combinations and therefore hold veto power 
over their ultimate consummation.4 In contrast, employees have no say. 
Even unionized employees do not have the right to bargain over these 
transactions; at most, they can merely bargain about their effects.5 
However, as the e-mail in this article’s epigraph vividly demonstrates, 
employees do have opinions about mergers, acquisitions, and other such 
transformative corporate transactions. Some of these opinions may be 
fairly predictable: for example, employees will be fearful of a merger that 
promises to eliminate huge swaths of the company’s workforce. But 
employees also have more nuanced opinions about their work 
environment—opinions based on much more intimate knowledge about 
the company than shareholders typically have. These opinions may be 
overlooked in the post-announcement excitement, especially since 
management has an interest in hearing only positive news about the 
forthcoming combination. 
This Article proposes that employees be given the right to vote on 
mergers, sales of substantially all assets, and the other corporate 
combinations for which shareholders can vote. Unlike shareholders’ 
ballots, the employees’ choices would not be binding on the company. 
Referenda would be held before the required shareholders’ elections so 
that shareholders could know about the results before they cast their votes. 
Although it might be possible to implement the referendum through 
federal law, states could also insert the referendum into their systems for 
corporate governance. 
Why require corporations to conduct nonbinding employee referenda? 
First, the referenda would improve the information flow surrounding 
corporate combinations and would lead to more efficient transactions. 
 
 
 3. In this description, I refer only to transactions in which two companies combine; I do not 
include hostile tender offers. Such offers may lead to shareholders’ selling their shares over the 
objections of the target company’s board. 
 4. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2007); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.03 (2002). 
 5. Employers need not bargain over issues that are within the “core of entrepreneurial control.” 
First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981) (no duty to bargain 
over decision to shut down part of business purely for economic reasons); Int’l Union, United Auto 
Workers v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 470 F.2d 422, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (no duty to bargain 
regarding “sale” of manufacturer-owned and operated retail outlets to franchisers). However, 
employers must bargain over the effects such actions have on terms and conditions of employment. 
First Nat’l Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 676. 
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Mergers and acquisitions are generally negotiated under a heavy shroud of 
secrecy by the very top levels of management.6 After the initial agreement 
is announced, management has a strong incentive to see that the merger is 
approved, weakening any incentive for a robust debate on the merits of the 
plan.7 An employee vote would provide concrete data about workers’ 
opinions on the merger. Although the vote would not have any legal 
effect, directors, management, and shareholders may find the expression of 
collective employee wisdom to be useful in making their own 
determinations about the wisdom of the proposed combination. Moreover, 
the vote would offer employees and shareholders the opportunity to work 
together in furtherance of their mutual interest: curtailing managerial rent-
seeking. 
Second, the vote would make employees feel more a part of the 
company by giving them a voice in the process. Current corporate law 
doctrine treats employees as a purchased input, no different than raw 
materials or property expenses.8 A referendum would give employees a 
chance to express their opinion on the combination. Social psychology 
research has shown that employee voice leads to improved productivity 
and job satisfaction, as well as greater corporate compliance.9 Allowing 
employees to participate in the process creates a greater likelihood that 
employees will buy into the merger and thus work for its success. In 
addition, the process of collective deliberation has the potential to create 
social capital that will come into play in other societal moments of 
democracy. 
Finally, the proposed referenda would impose relatively small costs on 
companies. With improved technology, it is much easier and less 
expensive to conduct a companywide election than it once was.10 Rather 
than mailing proxy materials to employees, employers will be able to use 
interoffice mail, e-mail, and internet web pages to distribute the necessary 
materials and conduct the final tally. The referendum presents an ideal 
 
 
 6. See DAVID A. BROADWIN, NEGOTIATING AND DOCUMENTING BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS 1–2 
(1997) (discussing the importance of confidentiality agreements to merger negotiations); J. Robert 
Brown, Jr., Corporate Secrecy, the Federal Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of Ongoing 
Negotiations, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 93 (1986) (“Most major arms length agreements are preceded 
by a period of negotiations that typically take place behind a veil of secrecy.”). 
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
 8. Cf. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 60–66 (2006) (comparing the 
presence of corporate law protections for shareholders with the absence of such protections for 
employees). 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/4
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opportunity for state experimentation—the “genius” of American 
corporate law.11 
The barriers between corporate and labor law have too long stymied 
efforts to provide employees with more involvement in their work life. 
Recent studies have made clear that workers want some form of 
meaningful participation in their place of employment.12 Traditional 
approaches such as employee ownership, employee stock option plans, 
labor unions, and work councils have failed thus far to provide such 
opportunities to a large percentage of the workforce.13 The implementation 
of employee referenda would finally give workers a voice on issues of 
corporate transformation, where their input would benefit managers, 
directors, and shareholders as well. 
I. THE PROPOSAL 
In the United States, corporations are creatures of state law.14 The 
delegation of such a critical legal regime to a collection of fifty 
independent governmental regimes has drawn both praise and criticism.15 
What is perhaps more remarkable, however, is the relative uniformity of 
corporate law despite its many creators. In these different regimes, the 
central locus of authority within the corporation is the board of directors.16 
The board has the authority to hire the officers of the corporation and to 
terminate the officers according to contractual provisions. Although we 
generally think of the chief executive officer (CEO) as the head of the 
 
 
 11. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 151 (1993). 
 12. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 68–71 (1999). 
 13. About eight percent of the private work force is represented by a union. Economic News 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2007, Table 3: Union 
Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and Industry (Jan. 25, 2008), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm. The National Center for Employee 
Ownership estimates that 10.5 million workers participate in ESOPs, stock bonus plans, and profit 
sharing plans primarily invested in employer stock, and that 10 million employees participate in stock 
option plans. National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO), A Statistical Profile of Employee 
Ownership (updated May 2007), http://www.nceo.org/library/eo_stat.html. See also Robert Hockett, 
What Kind of Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other SOPs, and “Ownership 
Societies,” 92 CORNELL L. REV. 865, 874 (2007) (discussing the low level of stock ownership among 
average employees). 
 14. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 31 (2d ed. 2003). 
 15. See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 11, at 148–51 (praising the system); William L. Cary, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 706 (1974) (criticizing 
it). 
 16. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (discussing how boards of directors control 
corporations). For an example of the statutory provisions giving directors control, see DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 141 (2007). 
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corporation, the board has the authority to remove the CEO from office.17 
In turn, the shareholders have the authority to elect the board.18 This power 
structure has led to the conception that shareholders are the ultimate 
“owners” of the corporation.19 However, directors have the right to run the 
corporation largely as they wish and need not follow the dictates of a 
majority of shareholders on any particular issue.20 They are thus akin to 
Burkean representatives: the elected representatives of their constituencies 
who may govern largely according to their personal conscience.21 
For certain fundamental corporate acts, however, directors need the 
approval of a majority of shareholders. Amendments to the corporation’s 
charter or articles of incorporation must generally be approved by the 
board and by the shareholders.22 Shareholders must consent to the 
voluntary dissolution of the corporation.23 In addition, states generally 
have required shareholder approval for transactions that transform the 
institutional structure of the corporation through a combination with 
another corporation. The standard method of combination is the statutory 
merger.24 However, corporations also de facto combine when one 
corporation buys the assets of the other corporation or when a corporation 
buys another corporation’s shares through a tender offer. However, not all 
corporate combinations require shareholder approval. Mergers generally 
require shareholder approval from the shareholders of both companies.25 
 
 
 17. COX & HAZEN, supra note 14, at 136. 
 18. Id. at 328. 
 19. Current corporate scholars largely consider this notion to be a misconception. See, e.g., 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 604 
(2006) (calling this view “deeply erroneous”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for 
Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2002) (“From both a legal and an economic 
perspective, the claim that shareholders own the public corporation simply is empirically incorrect.”). 
 20. For an early expounding of this principle, see Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. 
v. Cuninghame, [1906] 2 Ch. 34 (Eng. C.A.). 
 21. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. 
L. REV. 83, 102–03 (2004) (describing directors as “vested with wide powers to exercise their 
discretion by fiat”). Burke is famous for his advocacy of a representative’s use of his or her own 
judgment in representing constituents. See Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol § 4.1.22, 
Nov. 3, 1774, available at http://www.econlib.org/Library/LFBooks/Burke/brkSWv4c1.html (“Your 
Representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving 
you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”). 
 22. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2007); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (2002). 
 23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(b) (2007); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.01 (2002). 
 24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2007); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.03 (2002). 
 25. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 14, at 609 (“Most states now provide for majority approval by 
the shares entitled to vote . . . .”). Cox and Hazen note, however, that Massachusetts requires the 
approval of two-thirds of the shareholders, and New York requires a two-thirds vote for corporations 
created before 1989. See id. at 609 n.4 and accompanying text (citing MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156, § 
46B(5) (Law. Co-op 2000) & N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 903 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 2002)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/4
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In Delaware, the state of incorporation for roughly fifty percent of the 
nation’s public companies,26 mergers require approval from the 
shareholders of both companies unless the company’s charter would 
remain unchanged postmerger and less than twenty percent of the 
company’s outstanding common stock would be involved in the merger.27 
Shareholders must also approve a corporation’s sale of “substantially all” 
of its assets.28 This language, which is found in every jurisdiction, has 
been interpreted with some variation, but it generally means the sale of a 
significant portion of the corporation’s assets in a transaction outside the 
corporation’s regular course of business.29 
Why are shareholders given the right to veto these transforming 
transactions? According to one commentator, the basic idea is that 
“sudden, deliberate (that is, manager-initiated), major or ‘organic’ 
corporate changes that affect shareholder interests ought to be approved or 
consented to by some majority of the shareholders.”30 There seem to be 
two primary concerns here: first, a concern about the drastic nature of the 
change, and second, a concern that this change is initiated and controlled 
by management. With respect to the nature of the change, corporate law 
aims to give shareholders the right to vote down a proposal that would 
significantly alter the nature of the holdings in the company. As residual 
claimants, shareholders are considered the most “vulnerable” of the 
corporation’s stakeholders to management agency costs.31 Severe changes 
in the nature and scope of the enterprise will have more of a direct effect 
on their rights than the rights of bondholders or employees. In fact, 
mergers often force shareholders to exchange their stock for stock in 
another company or in a newly formed company.32 Given the changes in 
their contractual rights, shareholders have a strong interest in having some 
 
 
 26. The web site for Delaware’s Division of Corporations states that “[m]ore than 800,000 
business entities have their legal home in Delaware including more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-
traded companies and 60% of the Fortune 500.” Del. Dep’t of State, Division of Corporations, 
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/default.shtml.  
 27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c), (f) (2007). 
 28. Id. § 271(a). 
 29. COX & HAZEN, supra note 14, at 594–96. 
 30. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 10.2.4 at 414 (1986). 
 31. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 1–39 (1991). 
 32. For example, in its merger with Alcatel, Lucent Technologies was absorbed into an Alcatel 
subsidiary and ceased to exist. Former Lucent shareholders were given shares in the Alcatel 
subsidiary. See Lucent Technologies Form 8-K, Filing 061260746, Dec. 6, 2006 (Item 8.01), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (search “CIK” for “1006240”; follow 
link for Form “8-K,” Filing Date “2006-12-06”). For a description of the process, see Jeffrey L. Kwall, 
What is a Merger? The Case for Taxing Cash Mergers Like Stock Sales, 32 J. CORP. L. 1, 2–3 (2006). 
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control over the transformation of their company’s internal corporate 
structure.33 
There is also a concern that transformative transactions offer an 
opportunity for management to protect its own interests at the expense of 
the shareholders.34 Corporate combinations offer executives an 
opportunity to receive a one-time monetary, stock, or stock-option bonus 
based on the fulfillment of the merger. When one company’s management 
will be replaced or subordinated as a result of the transaction, the deal will 
often arrange for a large payout to those managers as compensation for 
their loss of position.35 Conversely, executives of the newly formed 
company may give themselves bonuses for having successfully carried out 
the combination.36 Having the right to veto a transaction gives 
shareholders power to vote down a transaction that would reward 
management at the expense of the shareholders.37  
This Article proposes a small change to the merger approval process: 
an employee referendum for transformative transactions which would 
piggyback on top of the existing system of shareholder voting rights. 
Employees at a company involved in a combination would be entitled to 
vote in a nonbinding referendum on the combination whenever 
shareholders also had the right to vote on the combination. All employees 
would be entitled to cast a ballot. The referendum would be held prior to 
the shareholders’ vote, with enough time for the results of the referendum 
to be communicated to shareholders prior to their vote.38 Since the 
referendum would not be binding on the corporation, the directors, or the 
shareholders, victory or defeat would have no legal effect on the proposed 
transaction. The percentage of employee votes for and against would be 
 
 
 33. More generally, former Delaware Chancellor Allen has described the shareholder franchise 
as “the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.” Blasius Indus., 
Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 34. The field of corporate law has largely centered around the general problem of management 
opportunism. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 31; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 171 (1996).  
 35. For example, James Kilts, the former CEO of Gillette Company, received a package worth an 
estimated $165 million as part of the merger of Gillette with Procter & Gamble. Gretchen Morgenson, 
What Are Mergers Good For?, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2005 (Magazine), at 56, 58. 
 36. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 127–30 (2004) (discussing bonuses paid for acquisitions). 
 37. Morgenson, supra note 35, at 58 (discussing how MONY shareholders threatened to vote 
against a merger with AXA because of the high compensation to MONY executives). 
 38. Delaware requires notice to shareholders about the merger vote at least twenty days prior to 
the meeting date. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2007). The employee referendum would need 
to be held early enough so that the shareholder proxy materials could include the results of the 
referendum. 
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the critical information communicated to the shareholders and, by 
extension, the general public. 
Further specifics are, of course, in order. The statute would need to 
define the corporation’s “employees” for purposes of the vote. The statute 
would have to describe the timing and scope of the required disclosure that 
would be made to shareholders about the employees’ vote. The statute 
could also set forth the necessary procedures for the referendum, as well as 
whether there were any remedies for improper procedures. These details, 
and their effect on the proposal, are discussed further in Part IV of the 
Article. As a reference for what such a statute might look like, I have 
included an extremely simplified proposed amendment to Delaware law in 
the Appendix. 
The lack of any legal effect to an employee referendum may prompt an 
initial concern that such a vote would be “meaningless.” The vote would, 
in fact, have no legal effect on the outcome of the proposed transaction; 
employees could vote overwhelmingly to reject a proposed merger only to 
see it enacted through director and shareholder approval. Given the lack of 
legal power behind the employee vote, what would be the point? The point 
is not to create a regime of employee participation in governance, along 
the lines of the German system of codetermination.39 Such a system would 
require real power sharing, whether through board participation, expanded 
union powers, or some form of binding referenda.40 But this proposal is 
not a piece of that endeavor. In fact, the objective of this proposal is to 
reap a portion of the benefits of employee participation without some of 
the drawbacks and complications codetermination engenders. With this in 
mind, I now turn to the reasons in support of the proposed system of 
nonbinding employee referenda: more information, greater voice, and the 
low costs of experimentation. 
II. REFERENDUM AS INFORMATION 
As a nonbinding resolution, the results of the employee referenda 
would have no inherent legal power of their own. What the referenda 
would provide, however, is information—information about whether the 
company’s employees support or object to the corporate combination 
 
 
 39. For one discussion of German codetermination, see Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A 
Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
163 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999). 
 40. For a recent proposal that employees should participate in the direct election of the chief 
executive officer, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, On the Direct Election of CEOs, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
261, 281–82 (2006). 
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proposed by management. As discussed below, this information would be 
useful to those groups who have power over the transactions: shareholders 
and boards of directors. This information would increase the likelihood 
that shareholders and directors would reject inefficient transactions. As a 
result, management would do a better job in carrying out these 
transactions from the start.  
In order to understand what this information would convey and how it 
would affect corporate decision making, it is helpful to begin with a brief 
description of both the purposes and the processes of mergers and 
acquisitions. 
A. The Purpose of Corporate Combinations 
It may seem like overkill to spend time considering the purpose of a 
corporate combination. Combining two companies is one of many possible 
business decisions and thus should share the same rationale as the decision 
to borrow money, hire employees, or purchase raw materials; like any of 
these decisions, the decision to combine with another company should rest 
on the same principles behind the corporation itself. As is well known, 
however, the purpose of the corporation itself has been the subject of 
prolonged, sustained debate among corporate-law scholars.41 Proceeding 
without considering this debate risks a failure to establish first principles 
and, thereby, a failure to establish the criteria upon which the employee 
referenda proposal is to be judged.42 
Corporate-law scholars generally employ a utilitarian approach, 
seeking to maximize the overall gains to society through the corporate 
form. In pursuing this end, the majority of corporate scholars ascribe to the 
notion of “shareholder primacy,” or “shareholder wealth maximization.”43 
The theory of shareholder wealth maximization posits that by maximizing 
the returns to shareholders above all other corporate goals, the corporation 
 
 
 41. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: 
A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (2002) (“The past 
two decades have witnessed a rigorous continuation of the long-standing debate about the proper role 
of the corporation in our society.”). 
 42. William Klein has recently criticized the failure of corporate law academics to establish such 
first principles clearly. See William Klein, Criteria for Good Laws of Business Association, 2 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 13, 15 (2005) (“Academics debating various aspects of the law of business 
associations are often like ships passing in the night. One reason for their inability to join issue may be 
a failure to identify goals or objectives—the failure to weigh proposals against explicitly stated criteria 
and to engage in effective cost-benefit analysis.”). 
 43. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 798 (2002) (“Today, most corporate law scholars embrace some variant of 
shareholder primacy.”). 
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will also maximize its contribution to societal efficiency. This conception 
rests on the shareholders’ role as the sole “residual claimants” within the 
corporation. According to the theory, other actors within the corporation—
creditors, employees, customers, suppliers—have a relationship to the 
corporation that is fairly well defined through contract.44 However, 
shareholders’ returns are residual; they are not payable until the other 
contractual participants have been fully satisfied.45 In order to maximize 
social wealth, the corporation’s organizing principle should be the 
maximization of the residual returns payable to shareholders. In this way, 
all other claimants receive their contractual entitlements, and the 
shareholders’ remainder has been maximized. 
On the other side of this debate stand those who argue for a 
stakeholder-oriented conception of the corporation.46 According to 
stakeholder theorists, the corporation’s purpose should focus on serving all 
of the corporation’s stakeholders. In addition to shareholders, those with a 
stake in the corporation include management, employees, creditors, 
suppliers, customers, and even the broader community in which the 
corporation is situated.47 Stakeholder theorists argue that a corporation and 
its directors should focus on maximizing returns to all of these 
stakeholders. Although commentators differ as to the means, most agree 
that directors should have a significant degree of discretion in carrying out 
their duties so as to serve all of these interests.48 
Much of recent corporate-law scholarship has taken up this debate 
about the proper purpose of the corporation. Scholars disagree whether 
existing corporate law is more oriented toward shareholder primacy or 
stakeholder theory.49 There is also sharp divergence on normative grounds. 
 
 
 44. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 31, at 67–68. 
 45. Id. at 36–37. This perspective assumes that all other claimants have rigidly set contractual 
entitlements, such that paying them more would be akin to a gift. 
 46. See Stout, supra note 19, at 1190 (citing William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of 
the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–66 (1992)). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY 118–19 (2001) (arguing 
that boards of directors should be self-perpetuating); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 280–81 (1999) (arguing for the notion of 
directors as “mediating hierarchs” for the different constituencies at the firm). 
 49. Compare Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001) (“[A]s a consequence of both logic and experience, there is convergence on 
a consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make 
corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to 
those interests.”), with Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 650 (2006) (“Although corporate law mandates managerial fidelity to 
shareholder interests both through shareholder election rights and through fiduciary principles, existing 
law does not actually require officers and directors to make operational decisions with the sole 
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In 2001, one set of pro-shareholder-primacy commentators stated that 
“[t]here is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law 
should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value,”50 while 
a stakeholder theorist argued that the notion of stock price maximization is 
“as destructive as it is simple.”51 However, it is possible to make too much 
of this distinction. In the long term, stock price maximization will depend 
on keeping the other constituencies happy as well; cheating customers, 
employees, or creditors will surely harm the company and, by extension, 
its stock price. And stakeholder theorists have acknowledged that some 
focus on share price can be a useful tool for constraining the discretion of 
management.52 Courts, as a whole, have not spent too much time on the 
debate themselves, preferring to stick to the more practical concerns of 
fiduciary duties and conflicts of interest.53 
In this Article, I sidestep this debate, instead arguing that nonbinding 
employee referenda would be beneficial under both shareholder primacy 
theory and stakeholder theory. In other words, these referenda would 
improve overall societal efficiency regardless of whether the best route to 
such efficiency is shareholder wealth maximization or some version of 
stakeholder interests maximization. As discussed further below, this dual 
approach rests primarily on the role of the referenda in informing directors 
and shareholders,54 the role of the referenda in restraining management,55 
and the role of the referenda in improving employee morale, productivity, 
and efficiency.56 All of these benefits would lead to better results 
according to shareholder primacy as well as stakeholder theory.57 Thus, 
the purpose of corporate combinations need only be the same purpose as 
the corporate form—namely, increasing societal efficiency by maximizing 
returns to shareholders or maximizing returns to all of the stakeholders in 
the company. Moreover, there are reasons for concern that corporate 
 
 
objective of shareholder wealth maximization.”). 
 50. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 49, at 439.  
 51. MITCHELL, supra note 48, at 4. 
 52. Stout, supra note 19, at 1200. 
 53. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 280, 284–88 
(1998) (discussing how the concept of shareholder primacy has limited relevance to corporate law in 
practice). 
 54. See infra Part II.C. 
 55. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 56. See infra Part III. 
 57. What shareholder primary and stakeholder theory do not support is a strong notion of 
managerial primacy. Concern about agency costs has largely driven managerial primacy from the 
debate. See Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 549 (noting that managerial primacy “no longer has much 
traction in the legal academy”). 
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combinations, as currently constructed, are failing along both of these 
measures. 
B. Problems with Corporate Combinations 
The initial challenge raised to employee referenda may be that their 
absence under current law is a result of properly made market decisions. If 
the reform really increased firm efficiency, the argument goes, the market 
would have already developed it.58 However, there are reasons to think the 
market may be in need of some tweaking here. Corporate combinations 
have been the subject of extensive study in both law and finance literature, 
and there are grounds for believing that certain kinds of combinations 
decrease firm value. These substantive concerns coincide with procedural 
concerns about incentives on the part of executives, directors, and 
consultants to act inefficiently in their own self-interest. 
1. Substantive Problem: Poor Results 
Corporate combinations can often be scenes of shipwreck-level 
destruction for the companies involved. Although some potential for 
failure is inherent in any enterprise, there is evidence that corporate 
combinations may be generally value-reducing for the participating firms. 
The effects of corporate combinations on firm value and on stock price are 
much-studied phenomena in the financial literature. The results have been 
different for targets (smaller companies that will be taken over) as 
compared with acquiring companies. There is general consensus that in the 
very short term, when the corporate combination is announced, there are 
large positive abnormal returns to companies that are the targets of a 
proposed merger or acquisition.59 While there is conflicting evidence on 
acquirers, the evidence is sufficiently mixed that “the null hypothesis of 
zero abnormal performance to acquirers should not be rejected.”60 These 
results are attributable to the general process whereby the acquirer offers 
to pay a premium over and above the current market price for the target’s 
 
 
 58. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1736–44 (2006) (criticizing Lucian Bebchuk’s programme of shareholder 
empowerment because it has not already appeared in the marketplace). But see Michael D. Klausner, 
The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 793–96 (2006) 
(discussing how learning and network externalities may impair efficient corporate innovations). 
 59. Anup Agrawal & Jeffery E. Jaffe, The Post-Merger Performance Puzzle, in ADVANCES IN 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 7, 7 (Cary Cooper & Alan Gregory eds., 2000). 
 60. Id. at 8 (citing Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197 
(1986)). 
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shares. Indeed, offers that are at or are minimally above the current market 
price are generally rejected as nonserious.61 Thus, in the short term, gains 
from a merger announcement are often zero sum, as the short-term boost 
to the target is offset by the loss to the acquirer. 
Over the long term, moreover, there are indications that corporate 
combinations do not increase overall societal efficiency. Studies on long-
term returns for corporate acquisitions have generally shown “strong 
evidence of abnormal under-performance following mergers.”62 There is 
empirical evidence on both sides, and academics continue to refine and 
debate the best methods for determining long-term performance.63 
However, the overall pattern has been one of value-reduction in the long 
term. Numerous academic, financial, and media commentators have noted 
the failure of corporate combinations to bring long-term gains.64 
Furthermore, corporate combinations are more likely to fail in 
situations where the employee referendum would take place—namely, 
where a vote of the shareholders is required to execute the combination. 
As noted earlier, shareholders must vote to approve most mergers, as well 
as the sale of substantially all of their company’s assets.65 However, this 
 
 
 61. For example, Oracle was widely denounced for its initial bid to purchase PeopleSoft, which 
offered little to no premium over market price. As one analyst stated, “If [Oracle is] serious, they’re 
going to have to up their bid by a significant premium.” Andrew Ross Sorkin & Laurie Flynn, Oracle 
Takes $5 Billion Jab at PeopleSoft, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003, at C1, C2. See also Robin Sidel & 
David Bank, PeopleSoft Bid by Oracle Corp. Busts Tradition, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2003, at C1, C5 
(noting that the Oracle bid “broke two longstanding traditions of deal making: make an offer that 
carries a hefty premium to the target’s stock price and first approach the target privately with a friendly 
bid”). 
 62. Agrawal & Jaffe, supra note 59, at 37. 
 63. See, e.g., John D. Lyon et al., Improved Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock 
Returns, 52 J. FIN. 165, 165–67 (1999). 
 64. See, e.g., ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE ABOVE THE 
ASHES 14 (2005) (“The popular view is that M&A is a loser’s game.”); Robert G. Eccles, Kersten L. 
Lanes & Thomas C. Wilson, Are You Paying Too Much for That Acquisition?, HARV. BUS. REV. July–
Aug. 1999, at 136, 136 (noting “30 years of evidence demonstrating that most acquisitions don’t create 
value for the acquiring company’s shareholders”); James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: 
Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 280 (2001) (“Evidence 
from past merger waves shows that public companies engaging in mergers underperform their peer 
companies that have not followed similar acquisition strategies.”); Sara Moeller, Frederik P. 
Schlingemann & René M. Stulz, Firm Size and the Gains from Acquisition, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 201, 202 
(2004) (finding that in a study of large corporate acquisitions between 1980 and 2001, acquiring firms 
lost $303 billion in shareholder wealth); Morgenson, supra note 35, at 56 (“Academic research 
suggests that few mergers add up to significantly more prosperous or successful companies . . . .”); 
Gregory Zuckerman, Ahead of the Tape, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2002, at C1 (“Most just mergers don’t 
work. A mountain of academic research shows most acquisitions end up costing shareholders . . . .”); A 
Business Week Analysis Shows that Sixty-One Percent of Buyers Destroyed Shareholder Wealth, BUS. 
WK., Oct. 14, 2002, at 60 (looking at 302 large mergers of public companies from 1995 to 2001). 
 65. See supra Part I. 
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leaves large swaths of corporate combinations uncovered. Most notably, 
shareholders do not vote when the acquisition is through means of a tender 
offer. Instead, shareholders “vote” for a tender offer by tendering their 
shares to the acquirer, and the acquirer treats the purchase as a normal 
business transaction. This contrasts with mergers between two companies 
in which the companies trade stock to create a new corporation. Studies 
have demonstrated that companies involved in stock-for-stock mergers 
fare more poorly than companies involved in cash transactions in which 
one company purchases the other.66 
The information technology boom of the late 1990s is replete with 
examples of failed corporate combinations. Perhaps the most notorious of 
all corporate combinations is the merger between AOL and Time Warner. 
Known as “the worst deal in history,”67 the combination laid waste to the 
market value of the new company and led to the departure of almost all of 
the executives responsible for the union.68 Three years after the completion 
of the merger, shareholders in AOL Time Warner had lost over $200 
billion in equity value.69 Although the company has stabilized under 
current leadership, its stock price remains mired in place, and it recently 
was the subject of an aborted proxy battle.70 The AOL–Time Warner 
merger has become the paradigmatic example of a failed corporate 
combination.71 
Other high-profile deals have been less spectacularly unsuccessful, but 
unsuccessful nonetheless. In 2002, Hewlett-Packard (HP) CEO Carly 
Fiorina pushed through a merger with Compaq despite a proxy challenge 
from company director Walter Hewlett, son of one of HP’s founders. The 
media heralded the merger as a real victory for Fiorina, who succeeded 
despite litigation by Walter Hewlett alleging proxy improprieties.72 
However, the merger failed to revitalize HP, instead leading to Fiorina’s 
 
 
 66. See, e.g., Agrawal & Jaffe, supra note 59, at 46 (noting that “abnormal performance is worse 
for acquirers using stock-financing than for acquirers avoiding stock”); Carlos P. Maquierira, William 
L. Megginson & Lance Nail, Wealth Creation Versus Wealth Redistributions in Pure Stock-for-Stock 
Mergers, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 8 (1998) (noting that “research indicates that stock-for-stock mergers 
have systematically lower offer premiums for target firm stockholders, significantly negative abnormal 
returns for acquiring firm stockholders, and lower net synergistic gains created”). 
 67. SWISHER, supra note 1, at 9. 
 68. BRUNER, supra note 64, at 275–78. 
 69. NINA MUNK, FOOLS RUSH IN: STEVE CASE, JERRY LEVIN, AND THE UNMAKING OF AOL 
TIME WARNER 277 (2004). 
 70. See, e.g., Ken Auletta, The Raid, NEW YORKER, Mar. 20, 2006, at 132. 
 71. For a discussion of the AOL–Time Warner merger as an example of the dangers of the 
shareholder primacy ethos, see Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of 
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975 (2006). 
 72. See Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2002 WL 818091 (Apr. 30, 2002). 
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ouster in 2005.73 The merger’s difficulties came despite a complex plan, 
lauded in the press, that was designed to avoid the mistakes of past 
mergers.74 Other flawed combinations include the mergers of Mattel and 
The Learning Company (in which TLC became a division of Mattel),75 
CUC International and HFS (forming Cendant),76 and BankAmerica and 
NationsBank (forming Bank of America).77 Even those who question 
whether corporate combinations have generally poor results concede that a 
significant number of them have spectacularly poor results.78 
Having found a strange pool of inefficiency in otherwise efficient 
markets, scholars have sought out the reasons why. They have identified 
the following flaws in the process as potential reasons for the poor results. 
2. Process Problem: Limited Information 
The process of carrying out a corporate combination generally follows 
a prescribed pattern. Initially, officers at the highest levels of each 
corporation talk over the feasibility and desirability of a combination. If 
the top officers agree to a deal, then the companies must secretly and 
expeditiously conduct due diligence using high-level management and 
outside consultants. If this hastily conducted due diligence uncovers no 
problems, the boards approve the combination and announce the deal to 
the public and shareholders. The shareholders generally have a few 
months to digest the proxy materials and media reports before they vote to 
approve or quash the merger. If the combination receives shareholder and 
regulatory approval, the combination ultimately goes into effect. 
There are strategic reasons for the structure of this process. Executives 
begin in secrecy because news of negotiations can send stock prices up.79 
Competitors may also jump into the process if word gets out, making the 
negotiations more complicated and costly.80 Failed merger negotiations 
can damage both companies’ reputations, or make one company seem 
 
 
 73. Paul R. La Monica, Carly Fiorina Forced Out at HP, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 10, 2005, 
http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/09/technology/hp_fiorina/index.htm?cnn=yes.  
 74. Pui-Wing Tam, An Elaborate Plan Forces H-P Union to Stay on Target, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 
28, 2003, at A1. 
 75. See BRUNER, supra note 64, at 246–64. 
 76. See Fanto, supra note 64, at 272–73. 
 77. See id. at 274. 
 78. See BRUNER, supra note 64, at 95–340 (discussing particularly poor performers). 
 79. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234–35 (1988) (discussing the importance of 
keeping merger negotiations secret). 
 80. See Brown, supra note 6, at 93 (“Corporate officials fear that premature disclosure may result 
in a competitive disadvantage or may jeopardize continuation of the negotiations.”). 
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weak and ripe for the taking.81 The ramifications of such negotiations are 
so far-reaching that executives do their best to keep the discussions under 
tight wraps. The talks may be so secretive that only a handful of the 
company’s top executives even know about them.82 
While this secrecy serves a purpose, it also narrowly restricts both the 
information and the perspectives that can be brought to bear. The decision 
to actually carry out the merger is generally made at the very highest 
levels before any due diligence. For example, in the AOL–Time Warner 
merger, AOL CEO Steve Case and Time Warner CEO Gerald Levin made 
the decision to merge the two companies over dinner in a private room at 
the Rihga Royal Hotel.83 For the next two months, small groups of 
executives and advisors on both sides haggled over the final details—
including the number of board seats each side would have in the new 
company and the values of shares given to each side’s shareholders.84 The 
negotiations were intense, and the transaction was called off at various 
points. Ultimately, Levin and Case made the final agreement over dinner 
with just two other executives present.85 Only four executives at Time 
Warner knew about the possibility of a merger before the agreement had 
been reached.86 
While Levin may have been unusually secretive with his upper-level 
cohorts, the general rule for merger negotiations is a shroud of secrecy 
maintained by a small number of executives and advisors.87 As a result, 
 
 
 81. See, e.g., Dale Oesterle, Hard Lessons for Harvey Electronics, Business Law Prof Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2007/12/hard-lesson-for.html (Dec. 29, 2007) (noting 
that “a failed merger negotiation, once publicly announced and far along, can have heavy, heavy costs 
for a company”). 
 82. See MUNK, supra note 69, at 141–43 (discussing how AOL CEO Steve Case and Time 
Warner CEO Gerald Levin met in secrecy at hotels and homes to carry out their talks). 
 83. See MUNK, supra note 69, at 143 (“By the end of the evening, Levin and Case were of one 
mind. Together they could create the world’s most powerful and respected Internet-driven media and 
entertainment company.”). 
 84. Id. at 145–56. 
 85. Also present were Kenneth Novack, AOL’s vice chairman, and Richard Bressler, the head of 
Time Warner Digital Media. Id. at 156. 
 86. Id. at 158 (noting that only Bressler, Rob Marcus (who worked under Bressler), then-
president Richard Parsons, and deputy general counsel Chris Bogart had heard of the negotiations). 
The chief financial officer and the general counsel had no knowledge of the negotiations. Id. at 159–
60. 
 87. See, e.g., BILL VLASIC & BRADLEY A. STERTZ, TAKEN FOR A RIDE: HOW DAIMLER-BENZ 
DROVE OFF WITH CHRYSLER 227 (2000) (“Only ten executives in Chrysler knew of the pending deal, 
and only a few more than that at Daimler.”); Press Release, Walter Hewlett Responds to Statement 
from Hewlett-Packard (Feb. 19, 2002) available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/ 
companysearch.html (search “CIK” for “47217”; search “Prior to” for “2002–02–19”; follow link for 
File No “02553516”) (“According to [Hewlett-Packard] management’s own earlier claims, the 
Compaq merger [with Hewlett-Packard] is the culmination of a surprise telephone conversation 
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corporate combinations are extremely top-down affairs. The critical 
decision to combine is made at the very top, often by the CEO alone. Only 
after the decision to combine has been made are larger circles of 
executives and advisors included in the planning. 
Consequently, the board and the shareholders are often handed 
something of a fait accompli. Presumably the board has the benefit of due 
diligence conducted by investment banks, which is designed to draw out 
any potential flaws in the merger.88 But those conducting the due diligence 
know the end result they are supposed to reach: allow the combination to 
proceed. Due diligence is generally conducted by the same investment 
banks who have been working with the firms’ principals; these banks 
stand to earn fees if the combination proceeds.89 Moreover, they are often 
given incredibly short periods of time in which to conduct the diligence. 
For the AOL–Time Warner merger—the largest combination in history—
the banks had a three-day weekend to prepare their fairness reports for the 
companies’ boards.90 
The board has the final approval of the deal before it is announced to 
the media. As the situs of corporate power,91 the board might be 
considered the driver behind any corporate combination. However, boards 
may find themselves in a poor position to provide effective review. Much 
has been written about the role of the board in the modern corporation, and 
recent corporate governance reforms have focused on strengthening the 
board’s ability to monitor management.92 But boards are made up of top 
 
 
between [Hewlett-Packard CEO] Carly Fiorina and [Compaq CEO] Michael Capellas which occurred 
only a few short months before the merger was announced.”). 
 88. See, e.g., Goldman Sachs, Investment Banking, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ 
client_services/investment_banking/index.html; Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Note, Investment Bankers’ 
Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119, 121–25 (1986). For a 
narrative example of the role of financial advisors in a merger, see Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 2003 
WL 21003437, at *8–*12 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 89. MUNK, supra note 69, at 166 (noting that the two investment banking firms involved in the 
AOL–Time Warner merger each received a fee of $60 million); Giuffra, supra note 88, at 127–28 
(noting that “investment banks face strong incentives to provide opinions that serve management’s 
interests”). 
 90. MUNK, supra note 69, at 161–62. As one of the bankers involved in the opinions noted, “[i]f 
you do a deal over a weekend, you take shortcuts. . . . In hindsight, it was sloppy.” Id. at 163. 
 91. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 16. 
 92. Commentary on the board’s role in monitoring management has been voluminous. The 
discussion stems from the focus placed on managerial agency costs. See Jensen & Meckling, supra 
note 2. Many commentators have seen the board’s primary role as reducing these costs through 
monitoring. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
205–09 (1976) (discussing board structure to maximize monitoring). The failures of the boards to 
detect massive or blatant wrongdoing at such companies as Enron and WorldCom have led to a 
reexamination of the board as monitor. See, e.g., Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, 
Monitoring Corporate Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007] NONBINDING EMPLOYEE REFERENDA 889 
 
 
 
 
management or part-timers. The part-timers may or may not be 
independent, and even so-called independent directors often have powerful 
ties or obligations to management.93 In any event, they are part-timers, 
generally with significant responsibilities of their own to other firms.94 As 
a result, their other responsibilities limit the time in which to carry out 
their monitoring functions. 
The condensed timeframe for the board’s decision exacerbates the 
limitations of part-time status. The need for secrecy may lead management 
to inform board members about the potential deal at the last minute.95 
Directors get much of their information about the deal from the bank’s 
fairness opinion, which may have been drafted with the purpose of 
convincing the board to do the deal.96 Generally, the board then has an 
extremely limited amount of time to decide on whether to do the deal. 
Critics contend that the process is not designed to provide board members 
with a true informational picture of the combination; rather, it is designed 
to get the board’s approval at the last minute, as a prelude to the formal 
announcement.97 
The announcement itself shows the front-loaded nature of the process. 
When the principals call a press conference to announce the combination, 
 
 
Corporate Governance, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 356 (2004).  
 93. See, e.g., In re Oracle Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003) (holding that 
directors, who were professors at Stanford University, lacked independence as to defendant executives, 
who had promised substantial charitable gifts to the university). For recent work on the function of 
independent directors, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 
1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007); Usha 
Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law, Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. 07-007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=968513. 
 94. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 36, at 31–37. 
 95. The need to keep merger negotiations secret was at the heart of Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224 (1988). The Court ruled that executives were not free to lie about their negotiations, despite 
the need for secrecy. Id. at 236. The Court reasoned that a consistent “no-comment” policy would 
protect the secrecy of the negotiations without misleading investors. Id. at 239 n.17. But see Jonathan 
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-
Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1069–71 (1990) (arguing that secrecy is critical to the M&A 
market and that lying should be permitted in that context). 
 96. See Lucien Ayre Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and 
What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27, 37 (“Bankers are thus likely to use their discretion 
to render opinions that serve the interests of managers.”); Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 
AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1562 (2006) (discussing how fairness opinions are “deeply flawed” because of 
their subjectivity, flawed methodologies, and conflicts of interest); Andrew Ross Sorkin, They’re All 
No. 1, But Are They Worth It?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007 (Business), at 1 (discussing the banks’ 
incentive to “make the deal happen”). 
 97. See, e.g., MUNK, supra note 69, at 170–74 (discussing the Time Warner board’s approval of 
the merger with AOL); Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 96, at 37–43 (discussing the conflicts of interest 
that might lead to such a result); Davidoff, supra note 96, at 1587 (noting that some contracts provide 
that the bank will only be paid, or will be paid more handsomely, if the transaction is approved). 
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the deal appears complete to the public.98 The announcement is not framed 
as one step in a process of approval but rather as the announcement of the 
actual deal, pending a few technicalities. The announcement has the air of 
a celebration, and the media often joins in on the fun.99 
In contrast to the board, shareholders are given significantly more time 
to make their decision concerning the merger and can look to the required 
proxy disclosure about the merger. Depending on the size of the merger, 
the media may also be a source of information. But again, the process is 
designed not to give shareholders an active role in the combination, but 
rather to secure their “yes” vote with as little controversy as possible. State 
law and federal securities regulations require substantial disclosure when 
public companies solicit proxies.100 The materials tend to be quite 
lengthy.101 While the required disclosure is designed to provide 
shareholders with critical information, firms and their counsel generally 
design such disclosure in order to minimize risk of after-the-fact liability 
 
 
 98. For a recent example of premature closure, see Whole Foods Is Buying Wild Oats, ASSOC. 
PRESS, Feb. 21, 2007 (“Whole Foods Market Inc. said Wednesday it will pay $565 million for Wild 
Oats Markets Inc., a chain of natural and organic food markets in the United States and Canada.”); 
Andrew Martin, Whole Foods Buys Smaller Rival, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007 (web version). The N.Y. 
Times changed the title in time for the print version. Andrew Martin, Whole Foods Makes Offer for a 
Smaller Rival, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at C1. 
 99. See Fanto, supra note 64, at 298 (“[T]he media has celebrated [mega-merger] transactions 
and lionized the CEOs proposing them . . . .”).  
 100. State law generally requires that corporations have a duty to disclose the facts material to 
their stockholders’ decisions to vote on a merger. See, e.g., Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp., 
Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994). The test is generally stated as follows: “[A]n omitted fact is 
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in 
deciding how to vote. . . . Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of 
the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
‘total mix’ of information made available.” Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778–79 (Del. 1993) 
(quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). In Delaware, two recent cases 
by Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr. have highlighted the company’s disclosure obligation to 
shareholders. The vice chancellor enjoined a shareholders’ vote in In re Lear Corp. Shareholders 
Litigation, 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. 2007), because the company had failed to disclose the CEO’s 
financial situation that made a buyout personally favorable to him. See id. at 98 (concluding that 
shareholders were “entitled to know that the CEO harbored material economic motivations that 
differed from their own that could have influenced his negotiating posture”). In In re Topps Co. 
Shareholders Litigation, 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007), Vice Chancellor Strine held that the company 
had failed to disclose several critical factors to shareholders about its proposed merger, such as the 
willingness of the acquirer to retain current management and the seriousness of a competing bid. In 
both cases, the shareholders’ vote was enjoined until shareholders received the appropriate disclosures. 
 Federal securities regulations provide for more uniform disclosure through § 14 of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2000). Specific disclosures are provided for in the 
regulations. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a–3, –101 (2007) (Schedule 14A). 
 101. For example, the proxy solicitation materials regarding the proposed Lucent-Alcatel merger 
are 175 pages plus 75 pages of appendices. See Lucent-Alcatel Merger Proxy Statement (Aug. 4, 
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (search “CIK” for 
“1006240”; follow link for Form “DEFA14A,” Filing Date “2006-08-07”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/4
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for improper disclosure.102 As a result, the disclosure tends to be a static, 
lump-sum document written primarily to advance the proposal while 
meeting legal requirements. 
In some circumstances (particularly for larger combinations), the media 
does play a role in investigating the proposal and serving as a check 
against management. However, business journalists generally need some 
sort of hook in order to generate interesting coverage. Most shareholder 
votes are dull affairs for the media, with the proposal receiving the 
overwhelming majority of votes.103 The only recent shareholder vote on a 
corporate combination that drew any press was the vote for the HP-
Compaq merger. That vote drew attention because of Walter Hewlett’s 
battle against the merger and subsequent litigation over the proxy 
contest.104 Even those combinations that draw a significant amount of 
attention may not receive appropriate journalistic scrutiny; the press has 
been largely adulatory of the CEOs who can bring off a high-stakes 
merger.105 
Thus, from start to finish, the typical corporate combination is 
hampered by the absence of critical information. At the beginning, the 
CEO and her trusted coterie must labor in secret in developing the basic 
decision on whether or not to combine. Once the CEO has decided to go 
forward, the board generally approves the combination under hurried 
conditions with information provided by those who are already invested in 
the deal—the CEO, her advisors, and an investment bank that stands to 
earn hefty fees if the deal goes through. Then, shareholders vote after 
receiving a thoroughly vetted, lengthy disclosure document and perhaps 
hearing some media scrutiny. By that point, however, the company itself 
has committed to the combination. Given this process, there is real reason 
 
 
 102. Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 146 (2006) 
(noting that companies base disclosure decisions on liability concerns). 
 103. Shawn Tully, Taking the Guesswork out of Proxy Voting, CNNMONEY.COM, Dec. 21, 2006, 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/12/25/8396763/index.htm (“[M]ost of 
the deals win shareholder approval by an overwhelming margin . . . .”). 
 104. See, e.g., Dawn Kawamoto, Walter Hewlett Speaks Out, CNET News, http://news.com.com/ 
2100-1001-858499.html. Hewlett hired consulting firms, made numerous presentations, and took out 
several ads all with the purpose of persuading shareholders to vote no. It is estimated that both sides 
combined spent over $100 million in their efforts to persuade shareholders. Steve Lohr & Michael 
Brick, Hewlett-Packard Claims a Victory in Hewlett-Compaq Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 
2002, at A1. 
 105. See Fanto, supra note 64, at 298–304. Even proxy advisors such as Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) have been strangely acquiescent toward many of the ill-founded mergers of recent past. 
See Tully, supra note 103 (“M&A is ISS’s weak point. It has a long record of recommending deals 
that were doomed from conception, and it has consistently endorsed mergers in which the buyer 
agreed to vastly overpay.”). 
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to question whether the information used in making the decision is 
optimal. 
3. Process Problem: Managerial Overconfidence 
Limited information is not the only obstacle to efficiently negotiated 
corporate combinations. Within the negotiations themselves, 
commentators have long been concerned that top executives may not be 
negotiating with economic rationality. Instead, there is a concern that 
CEOs may be acting with hubris—an inflated sense of their own abilities 
and the transactions they seek to effectuate.106 This hubris may be a 
product of two types of systematic irrationalities known as heuristics—the 
optimism bias and the commitment bias. These two heuristics form what 
one commentator has labeled the “optimism-commitment ‘whipsaw.’”107 
Scholars have keyed in on the effects of the optimism or 
overconfidence bias on high-level corporate decision makers.108 The 
optimism bias is one of the most well-chronicled and intuitively resonant 
biases.109 The bias refers to people’s irrational beliefs that they are smarter, 
more successful, and more talented than they actually are. The 
quintessential optimism bias study concerns questions about whether one’s 
ability in a certain area is “above average.” Subjects on average believe 
that their talents are above average.110 Relatedly, evidence also suggests 
 
 
 106. Richard Roll has argued that corporate takeovers were generally a value-neutral proposition, 
and therefore, rational executives would not seek them out. Roll, supra note 60, at 198 (“It will be 
argued here that takeover gains may have been overestimated if they exist at all.”). In order to explain 
the frequency of combinations, Roll relied not on rational market theory but rather managerial hubris. 
Id. at 200. Relying on the empirical evidence that individual decision making is not always rational, 
Roll noted that takeovers were an apt subject for such research, as takeovers reflect individual 
decisions. Id. at 199. Given that the data, in his view, did not show added value from takeovers to the 
acquiring firm, Roll hypothesized that managerial hubris—namely, the notion that a manager’s 
(higher) valuation of the target was better than the market’s (lower) valuation—was responsible for 
takeover activity. Id. 
 107. Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations 
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 147 (1997). 
 108. See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 37–39 (3d ed. 
1994) (discussing overconfidence among managers). 
 109. See, e.g., Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Financial Decision-Making in 
Markets and Firms: A Behavioral Perspective, in 9 HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: FINANCE 385–410 (R.A. Jarrow et al. eds., 1995) (“Perhaps the most robust 
finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are overconfident.”). 
 110. See David Dunning, Judith A. Meyerowitz & Amy D. Holzberg, Ambiguity and Self-
Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 324, 324 (Thomas Gilovich et 
al. eds., 2002) (finding that seventy percent of high school students in one study rated themselves 
above average in leadership skills, while only two percent ranked themselves below average on that 
dimension); Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 
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that individuals underestimate others’ abilities, especially those of their 
competitors.111 Optimism bias also leads individuals to believe that good 
things are more likely to happen to them, and bad things are less likely to 
happen to them, than they are to other people.112 Another component of 
the optimism bias is the so-called “illusion of control.” This irrationality 
means that “people not only think that they are better than average when 
skill or ability is relevant to outcomes, they sometimes believe that they 
have more control over outcomes than they do.”113 
Although the optimism bias creates an irrational perspective, social 
psychologists believe the bias may be rationally adaptive.114 A bias 
towards optimism gives the individual a reason to strive to overcome 
difficulties. It may inspire others to similarly persist. The illusion of 
control may lead individuals to try harder to succeed, since they have the 
“illusion” that success is within their grasp. In fact, many believe that 
corporate executives are well served by these very traits.115 The 
 
 
ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981) (finding that most drivers believe they are above-average 
drivers); D. Walton, Examining the Self-Enhancement Bias: Professional Truck Drivers’ Perceptions 
of Speed, Safety, Skill and Consideration, 2 TRANSP. RES. Part F 91, 99 (1999) (finding that nearly 
eighty percent of truck drivers believe they are safer drivers than the average truck driver); E. W. 
Zuckerman & John T. Jost, What Makes You Think You’re So Popular? Self Evaluation Maintenance 
and the Subjective Side of the “Friendship Paradox,” 64 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 207 (2001). This tendency is 
sometimes called the “Lake Wobegon Effect.” See Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-
Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 289, 291 n.3 (1999). 
 111. A recent example of such behavior is the case of “Rahodeb,” the online user name for Whole 
Foods CEO John Mackey. Mackey used his anonymous online account to praise Whole Foods and 
pillory competitor Wild Oats. David Kesmodel & John R. Wilke, Whole Foods Is Hot, Wild Oats a 
Dud—So Said “Rahodeb,” WALL ST. J., July 12, 2007, at A1. 
 112. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1524 (1998) (“A common feature of human behavior is 
overoptimism: People tend to think that bad events are far less likely to happen to them than to 
others.”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1091 (2000) (describing the 
overconfidence bias as “the belief that good things are more likely than average to happen to us and 
bad things are less likely than average to happen to us”). 
 113. Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 
21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 288 (2001). See generally Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of 
Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311 (1975). 
 114. See, e.g., Pamela C. Regan, Mark Snyder & Saul M. Kassin, Unrealistic Optimism: Self-
Enhancement or Person Positivity?, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1073, 1079–80 (1995) 
(finding that unrealistic optimism resulted in a greater chance of experiencing positive future life 
outcomes); Shelley E. Taylor & Peter M. Gollwitzer, Effects of Mindset on Positive Illusions, 69 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 213, 224–25 (1995) (demonstrating that people tend to use positive 
thinking when implementing goals). 
 115. Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent 
Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 
GEO. L.J. 285, 288 (2004) (noting that “over-optimism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy and a deep 
capacity for ethical self-deception are favored in corporate promotion tournaments, so that people who 
possess them are disproportionately represented in executive suites”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
894 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:871 
 
 
 
 
tournaments which drive the market for managerial talent reinforce 
optimism and the illusion of control by giving those with such biases a 
greater likelihood of success.116 
However, those same irrationalities that allow CEOs to climb the 
corporate ladder successfully also may work against the company’s 
fortunes when applied to business decisions. In fact, research has shown 
that executive overconfidence has demonstrated effects on corporate 
decision making. According to this research, executive overconfidence 
leads to excessive entry into unfamiliar markets,117 overpaying in the 
context of auctions,118 overreliance on the executive’s personal 
information and perspective,119 and undue faith that the market is 
undervaluing the executive’s own company.120 As a result, executive 
overconfidence may lead to a consistent pattern of market irrationality, 
resulting in inefficiencies. 
Furthermore, overconfidence can combine with another behavioral 
heuristic to do even more damage to corporate decision making. Social 
psychologists have identified a human tendency to stay with a project or 
endeavor past when it remains profitable or beneficial to do so.121  This 
reluctance to abandon prior sunk costs is known as the commitment 
bias.122 Studies have demonstrated this bias within the corporate world.123 
When commitment bias teams up with the optimism bias, executives will 
 
 
 116. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: 
Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968 (2002); Troy A. 
Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate 
Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673 (2005); Anand Mohan Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, Rationality, 
Overconfidence and Leadership (Univ. of Mich. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 00–022, 2006), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=244999. For a brief overview of the tournament for managerial 
talent, see Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance: The Tournament Alternative, 54 
EMORY L.J. 1557, 1586–87 (2005). 
 117. See, e.g., Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental 
Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306 (1999). 
 118. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF 
ECONOMIC LIFE (1992). 
 119. See, e.g., Antonio Bernardo & Ivo Welch, On the Evolution of Overconfidence and 
Entrepreneurs, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 301 (2001). 
 120. See, e.g., J.B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33 
(2002); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. 
FIN. 2661 (2005). 
 121. See Langevoort, supra note 107. 
 122. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 783 (2002) (discussing commitment bias). 
 123. See, e.g., Barry M. Staw, Rationality and Justification in Organizational Life, in 2 
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 45 (Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cummings eds., 1980); Charles 
R. Schwenk, Information, Cognitive Biases, and Commitment to a Course of Action, 11 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 298 (1986). 
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not only make overly optimistic choices, but they will also stay with those 
choices long after the evidence demonstrates the error—the 
aforementioned optimism-commitment whipsaw.124 The exacerbated 
effects of these irrationalities may lead to unethical behavior, as executives 
realize too late how bad the situation is and desperately try to get 
themselves out of it.125 
It is easy to see how these biases can lead to poor decision making in 
the context of corporate combinations. At the beginning of negotiations, 
the CEO and just a few trusted advisors are put in the position of 
determining whether the combination makes sense, and on what terms.126 
The success of the combination, in the eyes of the CEO, may largely 
depend on his or her own finesse and ability in making the transaction 
work. The overconfidence bias is thus likely to make the CEO more 
inclined to believe that he or she can make the combination a success. 
Once the two sides agree to the transaction, the commitment bias takes 
over. Even though only the CEO and a small group of executives have 
decided on the combination, in their minds the commitment has been 
made. Thus, they are prone to push hard for the deal and genuinely (if 
even irrationally) believe that the deal will make the corporation better off. 
The commitment bias then will affect the board’s judgment once it decides 
in favor of the transaction. These players are thus more likely to stick with 
their decision even if further evidence changes the cost-benefit analysis 
that a bias-free actor would make. 
As noted earlier, scholars have particularly noted the presence of 
managerial overconfidence and hubris in the market for corporate 
control.127 Unlike other areas of corporate conduct, the finance literature 
has made a place for behavioral irrationalities such as overconfidence in 
large-scale mergers and acquisitions. These irrationalities place a further 
burden on the combination process. 
 
 
 124. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See BRUNER, supra note 64, at 347 (“Overoptimism (also called ‘hubris’) is pervasive at the 
start of most of these failed deals.”). 
 127. In his article on CEO overconfidence, Troy Paredes turns repeatedly to corporate 
combinations for examples of overconfidence at work. See Paredes, supra note 116, at 674–75 
(discussing Comcast’s bid to acquire Disney); id. at 692 (discussing VeriSign’s acquisition of Network 
Solutions); id. at 745 (discussing a remedy against overconfidence in the context of “big-ticket items, 
such as significant mergers [and] acquisitions”). Another recent study found evidence of behavioral 
heuristics and biases in the context of required disclosure documents for the thirty biggest stock-for-
stock mergers over a three-year period. See James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of 
Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1354–74 (2001). 
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4. Process Problem: Managerial Financial Incentives 
In addition to irrational biases in favor of the combination, managers 
and directors will often have quite rational biases in favor of executing the 
deal. Because combinations are a time of upheaval and reorganization, 
they are also a time to revisit the positions and compensations of the 
executives and directors who run each company. It should not be 
surprising that companies often make large payouts at these times—
payouts that may not be justified under an arms-length system of 
compensation negotiation. 
The payments come on all sides and for all different reasons. When a 
small company is being merged into a bigger company, the so-called 
“target” company will often pay its departing executives a sizeable sum.128 
This payment is justified as compensation for a loss or downgrade of 
position, and it may be necessary to move a profitable combination 
forward. But it also means that these managers and directors can exact a 
price for their acquiescence to the plan—a premium unavailable to most 
employees. That premium may be excessive and against shareholder 
interests. Sometimes this payment is made by the target company itself, 
while in other cases the acquiring company pays the sum. In both cases, 
there is concern that the executive will become too attached to the payout 
and will fail to follow shareholder interests.129 
Companies also give executive bonuses when they are on the acquiring 
end of the deal. According to one study, the acquiring company’s CEO 
received a gratuitous multimillion-dollar bonus in about forty percent of 
acquisitions.130 The bonuses are often given as cash for work that falls 
within the overall job expectations of a chief executive officer. Acquisition 
bonuses are a critical example of the “managerial power” thesis: these 
bonuses are not the result of compensation negotiations but rather the 
CEO’s power over the board.131 In addition, they provide a powerful 
incentive for executives to pursue acquisitions. Another recent study has 
found that executives’ decisions to expand company size are associated 
 
 
 128. These may be referred to as “golden parachutes,” since they insure the executives a soft 
landing after they have been jettisoned by the company.  
 129. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 36, at 91 (relating the story of a $170 million “retention pool” 
for MCI executives promised by British Telecommunication in a proposed merger; the executives then 
continued to support the merger even after BT reduced its offer by twenty percent). 
 130. Yaniv Grinstein & Paul Hribar, CEO Compensation and Incentives—Evidence from M&A 
Bonuses, 73 J. FIN ECON. 119 (2004). 
 131. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 36, at 127–29. 
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with increases in subsequent pay.132 There is a real concern that “the 
promise—or even the expectation—of an acquisition bonus could 
exacerbate managers’ excessive acquisition tendencies.”133 
In addition, shareholders may not know ahead of time whether the 
board will view the merger and its implementation as a justification for a 
substantial bonus after the merger has been approved. In his campaign 
against the HP merger with Compaq, renegade director Walter Hewlett 
raised this issue explicitly. In a report distributed as part of his campaign, 
Hewlett accused the company of “hiding the ball” with respect to 
postmerger compensation.134 Because he believed that management was 
not forthcoming, he leaked board discussions that had contemplated 
compensation packages totaling more than $115 million.135 It is, of course, 
highly unusual to have a dissident board member leak such information; 
shareholders are generally not privy to such understandings or discussions. 
Given the propensity for managers to use combinations as a reason for 
higher pay, it is no wonder corporate combinations themselves have come 
under greater scrutiny.136 Even if such bonuses are based on desert, they 
still can provide a powerful incentive to initiate or continue with deals that 
should not be done. 
5. Process Problem: Deal-Protection Provisions 
In addition to the information and behavioral problems that can lead to 
bad corporate combinations, many firms find themselves locked into a 
decision not only by commitment bias but also by contractual provisions. 
Deal-protection provisions include: agreements to sell certain assets to the 
bidding company at a reduced price if the transaction does not go through; 
agreements to submit the transaction to the shareholders, even if the board 
changes its mind; termination fees if the transaction does not occur; and 
side agreements with key shareholders as to their votes. Such provisions 
 
 
 132. Lucien A. Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, Firm Expansion and CEO Pay (Harvard Univ. Olin 
Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 533, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=838245. 
 133. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 36, at 128. 
 134. Walter B. Hewlett, Edwin E. Van Bronkhorst & William R. Hewlett Revocable Trust, Proxy 
Materials, Report on Executive Compensation (Feb. 26, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/ 
searchedgar/companysearch.html (search “CIK” for “1136512”; follow link for Form “DFAN14A,” 
Filing Date “2002-02-26,” Acc. No. “0000891618-02-000921”). 
 135. Id.  
 136. Gretchen Morgenson answered the title of her article What Are Mergers Good For? with: 
“Not much, unless you’re one of the bankers or executives whose compensation goes up with every 
deal you do.” Morgenson, supra note 35, at 56. 
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have been the subject of considerable judicial consideration and academic 
discussion for their role in discouraging hostile takeovers.137 
There is substantial literature in support of deal-protection provisions: 
such provisions protect the initial bidder and may increase the likelihood 
that bidders will enter into combination agreements in the first place.138 
However, such provisions also extract a price: they make it much more 
difficult for boards and shareholders to get out of a deal after the fact. In 
fact, deal-protection provisions are often written to provide protection to 
the disappointed firm even if the shareholders reject the proposed 
combination.139 Certainly deal-protection provisions offer an opportunity 
for managers and directors to make it more painful for shareholders to 
reject a proposed merger. The costs of such proposals have led some 
commentators to recommend more judicial skepticism of such 
provisions.140  
C. The Employee Referendum as Information Generator 
An overview of the corporate combination process reveals problematic 
tendencies toward inefficient behavior. The combination begins with 
discussions between a small group of executives at the highest level, who 
are by necessity acting on limited information. However, they soon 
become locked into the deal, and the other participants in the process—
namely, the directors and the shareholders—often play a purely 
 
 
 137. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 939 (2003) (holding certain 
deal-protection provisions invalid); In re Toys “R” Us Shareholder Litigation, 2005 WL 5756357 (Del. 
Ch. 2005) (upholding deal-protection provisions); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger 
Agreements and Lock-Ups in Negotiated Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239 (1990); John C. Coates 
IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 307 (2000); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1539 (1996). 
 138. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of 
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 29 J. CORP. L. 569, 595–615 (2003) (arguing that restriction on deal-
protection devices may reduce shareholder welfare by decreasing a target board’s options in the midst 
of competing deals); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware 
Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1461 (2005) (“I think most objective observers believe that the majority decision 
[in Omnicare] was simply wrong.”). 
 139. See, e.g., Lucent-Alcatel Merger Proxy Statement, supra note 101, at 8 (“A fee of $250 
million, which is referred to as the initial termination fee, will be payable by one party to the other 
party if: (a) either party terminates the merger agreement because the paying party’s shareholders 
failed to approve the merger . . . and prior to the paying party’s shareholders meeting, a competing 
acquisition proposal was made known to the paying party”).  
 140. Coates & Subramanian, supra note 137, at 389 (“[L]ockups can in fact protect deals from 
third-party higher-value bidders, thereby reducing allocational efficiency in the market for corporate 
control.”). 
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reactionary role. When the participants fail to obtain and evaluate the 
necessary information, they make bad decisions. The efficiency of 
corporate combinations would improve with more information, 
particularly information from players who are not tied into the success of 
the combination. 
Employees are a natural fit for this role. In the 1980s and 1990s, both 
academic and popular business literature discussed the ways in which 
firms could take better advantage of the information held by employees.141 
The success of Japanese businesses led many to investigate ways in which 
Japanese firms sought to work with employees to better design the 
business.142 Groups such as “quality circles” and “quality improvement 
teams” were heralded as a way of getting workers to contribute their 
knowledge to the corporation.143 Such methods stood in opposition to 
hierarchical management structures and the Taylorist method of 
production, which held that managers generated the information and 
disseminated down the ladder.144 
The employee referendum would be one way of tapping into this 
employee knowledge base.145 The referendum would ask employees 
whether they thought the proposed merger should go through. The 
employees would be given some time to consider their vote and to talk 
amongst themselves. However, the vote would need to be taken soon 
enough so that the shareholders would have the results of the referendum 
 
 
 141. For a sampling of the legal academic literature—much of it involving employee ownership—
see MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL (1995); THE NEW RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN 
CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION (Margaret M. Blair & Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2000); 
JOSEPH R. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? (1988); HENRY HANSMANN, THE 
OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 66–119 (1996); SAUL A. RUBENSTEIN & THOMAS A. KOCHAN, LEARNING 
FROM SATURN: POSSIBILITIES FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (2001); 
PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990); Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 
67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159, 160 (1991).  
 142. See, e.g., ROBERT E. COLE, WORK, MOBILITY, AND PARTICIPATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE INDUSTRY (1980). Enthusiasm for Japanese production methods 
continues today. See Jon Gertner, From 0 to 60 to World Domination, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007 
(Magazine), at 34. 
 143. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. JURAN, QUALITY BY DESIGN (1992); DAVID I. LEVINE, REINVENTING 
THE WORKPLACE: HOW BUSINESS AND EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN (1995); PAUL LILLRANK & 
NORIAKI KANO, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT: QUALITY CONTROL CIRCLES IN JAPANESE INDUSTRY 
(1989). For a more recent example, see Erin White, How a Company Made Everyone a Team Player, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2007, at B1. 
 144. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and 
Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 143–46 (1988) (discussing Taylorism in the 
workplace). 
 145. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 
J. CORP. L. 657, 680–90 (1996) (discussing how participatory management improves the flow of 
information between management and employees). 
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for their own vote on the merger.146 The results of the referendum itself—
the percentage voting for, the percentage voting against—would be useful 
information. Beyond that, however, those results would in turn lead to 
efforts to explain the results. These explanatory efforts would generate 
more information about the merger and its wisdom. 
At first glance, the results of the referendum itself may not seem all 
that important. After all, it is a nonbinding referendum that simply says 
whether the employees believe the merger is a worthwhile endeavor. 
Much of this information, it could be argued, is accessible simply by 
asking the employees. However, although managers may be able to get a 
general sense of employee sentiment through internal channels, that 
anecdotal information is not the same as a referendum. Anecdotal 
information may be insightful, but it may also vary wildly from the actual 
reality. Managers cannot be expected to contact every employee about his 
or her thoughts on the combination.147 Given the lack of unionization 
among private sector employees,148 most companies do not have union 
representatives that they can turn to as barometers of employee sentiment. 
In addition, managers would be primed to read employee sentiment as 
supporting the merger, since they have already bought into it. 
Psychological biases would lead managers to overvalue employee support 
and undervalue employee criticism.149 In addition, employees would be 
more likely to publicly support the combination, whatever their own 
views, if they thought managers were looking for positive feedback.150 
Employees might be fearful that failure to support the combination would 
be punished. Finally, even if managers could get a realistic read on 
employee sentiment, they would in all likelihood keep that information to 
themselves. They are unlikely to share the information with directors, the 
 
 
 146. As discussed in Part IV, it may make sense to provide a mandatory set of disclosures to 
employees so that their vote is more well informed. To make the process less costly, it may be easiest 
to simply provide to employees the same information that is provided to shareholders. However, a 
state might opt not to impose any disclosure requirement, and simply let management decide how 
much information it wishes to share with employees. See infra Part IV. 
 147. Cf. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN 
THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMICS, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS 
205 (2004) (noting that “with so many layers separating the men in the executive suite from workers in 
the field, it was hard for top executives to know if the picture they had of their own corporation 
resembled reality” (citing THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE: 
LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S BEST-RUN COMPANIES 17–19 (1982))). 
 148. Union members account for only 7.5% of the private sector workforce. Economic News 
Release, supra note 13. 
 149. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the optimism bias). 
 150. Cf. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 12, at 141–42 (citing research that shows that employees 
want joint participation with management on worker organizations). 
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shareholders, or the public, particularly if employees are generally 
unfavorable about the transaction. 
The difficulties in determining employee sentiment without a 
referendum were highlighted in the recent proxy battle over the HP merger 
with Compaq. Both sides in that battle claimed that employees agreed with 
their position. In fact, HP shareholder and merger opponent David W. 
Packard commissioned independent polls of employees on the merger.151 
The polls were conducted by surveying residents in three towns that were 
known to have high concentrations of HP employees.152 The results 
showed that employees surveyed (which included retirees) were against 
the merger by a two-to-one ratio.153 However, HP claimed that it had 
internal survey data demonstrating that more than sixty percent of 
employees were in favor of the merger.154 Both sides attacked the other’s 
data.155 In both cases, however, the results reflected surveys of small 
portions of employees—not comprehensive efforts to determine what 
employees thought as a whole. 
In addition to providing a definitive, quantitative account of employee 
sentiment, the referendum would then generate a second level of 
information: reporting on the referendum’s results and the reasons behind 
those results. Once the votes were counted, the results would trigger a 
discussion about the meaning behind the numbers. They would provide for 
a more grounded dialogue among employees, managers, directors, and 
shareholders. Moreover, instead of merely relying on anecdotal accounts 
from individual employees, members of the press would have a concrete 
figure to discuss and dissect. They could then look to the company, 
employees, and analysts for explanations of the result. Much of this 
information would still be anecdotal, but it would be in response to a firm-
wide survey of employees. It would be grounded in a more scientific slice 
of reality.156 This second level of information generation would add an 
important layer of context to the raw numbers. 
 
 
 151. David W. Packard, Advertisement, The Case for the H-P Way, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2002, 
at C17, available at http://www.crn.com/it-channel/18837628. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Peter Burrows, What Price Victory at Hewlett-Packard?, BUS. WK., Apr. 1, 2002, at 36–37. 
 155. HP CEO Carly Fiorina referred to the Packard-commissioned polls as “employee surveys in a 
small town in Oregon with 500 employees and half of them are retirees.” Fiorina Says Pay No Heed to 
Hewlett, ZDNET (Feb. 28, 2002), http://www.zdnet.co.uk/misc/print/0,1000000169, 
210520139001084c,00.htm. David Packard attacked the company’s surveys as biased, directed at 
certain employees, and nonconfidential. Packard, supra note 151. 
 156. For example, stories about employee discontent will be more meaningful than simply the 
traditional handful-of-disgruntled-employees accounts. See, e.g., Alorie Gilbert, PeopleSoft 
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Having identified the type of information that the referendum would 
generate, we are still left with determining the usefulness of this 
information. Specifically, what does a vote for or against the combination 
say about that combination? What are the reasons behind it?  
An employee’s vote can likely be explained by three different general 
areas of concerns: business-judgment concerns, employee-related 
concerns, and managerial-opportunism concerns. Some employees may 
vote based solely on one of these reasons, while others may cast their vote 
based on all three. Each category would have different benefits and uses 
for management, directors, and shareholders. But this is the type of 
information that would likely bubble up in the referendum’s wake. 
1. Business-Judgment Concerns 
Business-judgment concerns reflect a judgment on the part of 
employees about the business sense of the combination. This judgment 
may be reflected in majority support for the combination (signaling 
agreement with the managers’ business judgment), or it may be reflected 
in majority disapproval of the combination (signaling disagreement with 
the managers’ judgment). Employees may agree or disagree with 
managers on a variety of business-related judgments: the culture of the 
other firm, the value of the other firm’s business or technology, or the 
need for a combination to expand the business or enter new markets. A 
vote that centered on these concerns would generate further information 
about these business-related issues. 
Information generated in this category is obviously useful to all three 
groups of decision makers: managers, directors, and shareholders. 
Managers would benefit by getting feedback on their planned 
combination. They might choose to abandon the plan if employees raise 
significant enough concerns. By contrast, employee support may bolster 
their confidence in the plan. Even if they disagreed with the employees’ 
judgment, knowing those concerns would make it easier for management 
to adapt the plan so that, down the road, employees could buy into the new 
arrangement. Employees must participate in and adapt to the combination 
to achieve a successful new company.157 
 
 
Customers, Employees Weigh Deal, CNET NEWS.COM (Dec. 14, 2004) (“Several employees 
interviewed at the firm’s Pleasanton campus on Monday, each of whom requested anonymity, 
expressed concerns about the deal.”). 
 157. David B. Jemison & Sim B Sitkin, Corporate Acquisitions: A Process Perspective, 11 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 145, 147 (1986). 
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Directors would benefit from the information in their role as stewards 
of the transaction and the firm. Although directors would have approved 
the merger before the referendum, they would maintain the ability to 
withdraw the combination from consideration by the shareholders or to 
recommend a “no” vote to the shareholders. Many merger agreements 
contain a “fiduciary out” clause, which gives the board the right to 
withdraw from the agreement if their fiduciary duties as directors require 
the deal to be nixed.158 If employee referenda were implemented, perhaps 
directors would stipulate that employee disapproval gives a board the 
discretion to terminate the agreement.159 An employee vote disapproving 
the deal, together with the information supporting that vote, may be 
sufficient to change a board’s mind about the wisdom of the transaction.  
Finally, shareholders might also look to the employees’ business 
judgment in casting their votes about the proposed combination. For 
reasons discussed above, management and directors might not give the 
proper weight to negative information generated by the employee 
referendum about the deal’s business impact.160 Executives and the board 
would have already formulated and executed the deal and then would be 
looking for shareholders to go along with the plan. Their buy-in, combined 
with behavioral heuristics, may lead them to irrationally ignore or discount 
business-judgment concerns generated from employees. Shareholders, 
however, would not be subject to these irrationalities and, thus, could vote 
against the plan based on the employees’ business-judgment concerns. 
Indeed, in the most hotly contested merger proxy contest in recent 
memory, both sides looked to employees to bolster their claims about the 
 
 
 158. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and the Why of an 
Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. LAW. 653, 654 (2000) (“A fiduciary out typically provides that if some 
triggering event occurs (often the receipt of a defined ‘Superior Offer’ and sometimes the receipt from 
the corporation’s outside lawyers of an opinion to the effect that the board must as a matter of 
fiduciary duty do an act that the contract forbids or must not do an act the contract requires), then the 
doing of that act (or the refraining from doing a required act) will not constitute a breach.”); Michael 
A. Stanchfield, Fiduciary Duties in Negotiated Acquisitions: Questioning the Legal Requirement for 
“Outs,” 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2261, 2263–66 (2001) (discussing the prevalence and varieties of 
such “outs”). There is some suggestion that a “fiduciary out” is necessary under Delaware law. See 
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2003) (“The fiduciary duties of a 
director are unremitting and must be effectively discharged in the specific context of the actions that 
are required with regard to the corporation or its stockholders as circumstances change.”); Edward D. 
Herlihy, Takeover Law and Practice 2005, 1528 PLI/CORP. 341, 394, Jan. 25, 2006 (“Omnicare’s 
emphasis on the ‘unremitting’ nature of the board’s duties to obtain the best price, and its flat per se 
rule that replaces previous factual, case-by-case analysis, may suggest that contracts will require some 
form of fiduciary out to pass muster in the future.”). 
 159. Of course, canceling the deal would likely result in a termination fee, but agreements 
generally require such fees even if shareholders vote down the proposed combination. 
 160. See supra Part II.B. 
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wisdom of the proposed transaction. In the battle over the HP-Compaq 
merger, both management and the dissident group argued that employees 
agreed with their position.161 In presentations and advertising, Walter 
Hewlett emphasized that HP employees were against the merger; one 
advertisement stated, “If employees are opposed to the Compaq merger at 
a rate of almost 2 to 1, what hope is there for the Compaq merger?”162 In 
addition, both the dissident group and David Packard quoted employee 
responses discussing the merits of the merger proposal.163 
Even if these scenarios are possible, one might question whether 
employees would actually have the business judgment necessary to detect 
and then vote against a proposed deal based simply on the merits. Firms 
generally do not call upon the combined judgment of employees in making 
business decisions; instead, executives are hired to make these big-picture 
decisions using their access to both public and confidential sources of 
information along with their intelligence and experience. The likelihood is 
slim to none (it might be argued) that employees, as a whole, would 
actually exercise better business judgment on a deal than management and 
the cadre of professionals who advise them. 
However, this conventional wisdom about employees’ judgment may 
be overstated and, in fact, misplaced. As discussed earlier, firms are now 
using methods to draw more and more information from their 
employees.164 Much of this activity is focused on the lower level, such as 
the shop floor.165 However, employees may also have collective wisdom 
on big-picture items as well. In The Wisdom of Crowds, James Surowiecki 
argues that firms should tap employees not only for bottom-level 
productivity concerns but also for top-level problems of cognition.166 
These are the problems that define corporate strategy and tactics. 
They include everything from deciding among potential new 
products to building new factories to forecasting demand to setting 
 
 
 161. See supra note 155. 
 162. Walter B. Hewlett, Do Not Trade HP’s Crown Jewel Imaging & Printing for Compaq’s Low-
Margin Commodity Computing Business, Advertisement (appearing in various newspapers on Feb. 26, 
2002 and Feb. 27, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html 
(search “CIK” for “1136512”; follow link for Form “DFAN14A,” Filing Date “2002-02-28”, Acc. No. 
“0000891618-02-000966”). 
 163. Id.; Packard, supra note 151. 
 164. See supra Part II.C. 
 165. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: 
POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 231–36 (1984) (discussing the practice of “flexible specialization” on 
the shop floor). See also MIKE ROSE, THE MIND AT WORK: VALUING THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE 
AMERICAN WORKER xxxiv (2004) (discussing the various intelligences of different types of workers).  
 166. SUROWIECKI, supra note 147, at 215–16. 
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prices to contemplating mergers. Today, in most corporations, the 
answers to these problems are ultimately decided by one man: the 
CEO. Yet they are the problems that . . . are probably most 
amenable to collective decision making, even if the collective is a 
relatively small group.167 
Surowiecki goes on to promote the use of “methods of aggregating 
collective wisdom” in making strategic decisions.168 In an age which saw 
the sharp rise and swifter fall of Enron—the allegedly “smartest guys in 
the room”169—the luster of professional expertise in strategic decision 
making has lost some of its shine.170 In its place, the use of collective 
intelligence, through such mechanisms as organizational structure, 
referenda, and information markets, has enjoyed a recent surge in interest 
and popularity.171 Similarly, the wisdom of the average employee has been 
heralded (again) in popular business literature.172 
Of course, employees may be wrong. But, if a majority of employees 
vote “no” based on business-judgment concerns, then at least management 
has an awareness of the problem and the opportunity to respond to those 
concerns. A more vigorous debate of the wisdom of the merger increases 
the likelihood that the eventual decision will be the most efficient one. 
2. Employee-Related Concerns 
The vote might also reflect concerns about the proposed transaction 
that pertain primarily to employee interests. For example, employees 
might vote for a merger because the merger would offer greater 
 
 
 167. Id. at 216. 
 168. Id. at 220–21. Surowiecki specifically discusses the uses of trading markets drawing a 
diverse mix of employees as methods of assessing projected sales and regulatory decisions. Id. at 221–
22. 
 169. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING 
RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003). 
 170. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, The Talent Myth: Are Smart People Overrated?, NEW YORKER, 
July 22, 2002, at 28 (arguing for organizational structure—not individual intelligence—as the way to 
institutional success, and criticizing the “McKinsey” approach to employee hiring).  
 171. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and 
Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2004); Michael Abramowicz, Predictive 
Decisionmaking, 92 VA. L. REV. 69 (2006); Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction 
Markets for Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (2007); Miriam A. Cherry & 
Robert L. Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices: Using Information Markets to Predict Supreme Court 
Decisions, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1141 (2006).  
 172. See, e.g., ORI BRAFMAN & ROD A. BECKSTROM, THE STARFISH AND THE SPIDER: THE 
UNSTOPPABLE POWER OF LEADERLESS ORGANIZATIONS 181–91 (2006); ADRIAN GOSTICK & CHESTER 
ELTON, THE INVISIBLE EMPLOYEE: REALIZING THE HIDDEN POTENTIAL IN EVERYONE (2006). 
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opportunities for employees to move up in the organization. Conversely, 
employees might vote against a combination because of proposed layoffs 
or closings that the combination would engender. Unlike business-
judgment concerns, employee-specific concerns specifically relate to the 
employee’s interests and may be counter to the interests of managers, 
shareholders, and other stakeholders in the firm. 
A “no” vote from a majority of employees may signal specific 
employee-related concerns about the proposed transaction. Most 
obviously, employees may be concerned about layoffs or terminations that 
would result from postcombination redundancies. In fact, the very reason 
for the deal may be the cost savings from a reduced payroll. Employee 
rejection of such a deal would be unsurprising and perhaps not all that 
illuminating to decision makers within the firm. 
However, for those who believe in a stakeholder or “mediating 
hierarchy” theory of board governance, an employee referendum offers a 
way to quantify the breadth of employee sentiment for and against a 
proposed transaction. As discussed earlier, stakeholder theorists believe 
that the role of the board is to balance among the concerns of the various 
stakeholders in the firm.173 Unlike shareholder primacists, who believe that 
directors must maximize residual returns to shareholders,174 stakeholder 
theorists argue that boards must generally maximize returns across all of 
the stakeholders to the firm. 
One clear example of stakeholder theory in action is the state corporate 
constituency statute. Over half of the states have a provision allowing 
directors to make certain decisions based on the needs of all corporate 
constituencies.175 New York, for example, provides that when considering 
a change or potential change in the control of the corporation, a director 
“shall be entitled to consider” the effects that the corporation’s actions 
may have upon the corporation’s various stakeholders, including current 
employees, retired employees, customers, creditors, and the communities 
in which it does business.176 The purpose of the statute is to give directors 
the freedom to consider the impact of a control transaction177 on 
 
 
 173. See supra Part II.A. 
 174. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 31, at 37–39. 
 175. See Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition 
for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 215 tbl.1 (2006) (finding that thirty-one states have 
constituency statutes). 
 176. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2003). 
 177. The statute states that “[f]or purposes of this paragraph, ‘control’ shall mean the possession, 
directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of 
the corporation, whether through the ownership of voting stock, by contract, or otherwise.” Id. 
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stakeholders other than shareholders. Constituency statutes have generated 
a voluminous literature both in favor and against such statutes.178 
The most generally recognized weakness of the constituency statute is 
lack of accountability for its use. Directors are only given authorization to 
consider the needs of other constituencies; they are not obligated to do 
so.179 Directors are not legally accountable to any of the stakeholders for 
failure to consider their needs.180 Thus, critics fear that constituency 
statutes will be used as a “fig leaf” by boards to act in their own interests 
rather than in stakeholders’ interests.181 Despite numerous proposals to 
beef up constituency statutes,182 they remain in their largely hortatory 
form. 
Employee referenda are a way of putting more substance into 
constituency statutes. In their current form, directors could cite to vague or 
anecdotal employee concerns in order to approve, nix, or counter a 
proposed corporate combination. With an employee referendum in place, 
directors would have a concrete representation of employee sentiment 
upon which to base their actions, at least for that constituency. The 
information generated in response to the referendum would also be useful 
to directors in formulating their constituency-balancing strategy. By 
providing quantitative evidence about employee views, the referendum 
 
 
 178. For a recent summary of the arguments for and against constituency statutes, see Brett H. 
McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1227, 1232–36 (2004). 
 179. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing 
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 579 (1992). 
 180. For example, New York’s statute states: “Nothing in this paragraph shall create any duties 
owed by any director to any person or entity to consider or afford any particular weight to any of the 
foregoing or abrogate any duty of the directors, either statutory or recognized by common law or court 
decisions.” N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2003).  
 181. Letter from Joseph Grundfest, Commissioner, Securities Exchange Commission, to Mario 
Cuomo, Governor for New York (June 6, 1989), cited in Mitchell, supra note 179, at 580 & 580 n.4. 
See also id. at 581 (“The principal criticism of rejecting this traditional relationship is that authorizing 
the board to consider constituencies that have no monitoring or enforcement powers would leave the 
board accountable to nobody.”); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and 
Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (“[A] stakeholder measure of 
managerial accountability could leave managers so much discretion that managers could easily pursue 
their own agenda, one that might maximize neither shareholder, employee, consumer, nor national 
wealth, but only their own.”). Even constituency statute proponents have deep concerns about this 
problem. See David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform 
Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 30 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (“However 
attractive [the constituency] model might be in theory, communitarian scholars have yet to show 
persuasively that it could function effectively in practice.”); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as 
Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 70 (1991) 
(noting that constituency statutes provide “very little” actual protection to employees and other 
constituents). 
 182. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 179. 
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would provide a better foundation for director decisions based on the 
stakeholder framework. 
More generally, the employee referendum supports the stakeholder 
model by looking for input from stakeholders other than shareholders on 
critical decisions of corporate strategy. Employees would have the 
opportunity to voice their own, potentially self-interested concerns, and 
directors could take those concerns into account. The referendum 
invigorates the stakeholder model by offering a concrete way for 
employees to reach the board with their input. Under stakeholder theory, 
directors are obliged to take this input seriously; directors could even 
incorporate the referendum into the process of the transaction itself.183 
Thus, even where employees simply vote based on their own interests, the 
employee referendum would be useful to corporate decision makers.184 
3. Managerial-Opportunism Concerns 
Thirdly, a vote might reflect employee concerns related to management 
and managerial opportunism. Even if the combination makes sense from a 
business-judgment perspective, employees might still vote against the 
merger if they believe management has used the transaction as an 
opportunity to extract unnecessary rents from the firm. 
As discussed earlier, corporate combinations offer management the 
opportunity to extract particularized rents.185 Because the combination 
requires some degree of reshuffling, both of the corporate structure and of 
the managerial hierarchy, the combination would generally require 
changes in managerial positions as well as compensation. The 
combination is often an opportunity for management to give itself bonuses 
for pulling off the merger. If the new corporation must offer new stock, 
 
 
 183. For example, as noted earlier, the transaction agreement could allow the board to terminate 
the merger based on stakeholder concerns, such as those expressed in the referendum. See supra notes 
157–59 and accompanying text. But, since the board would not be compelled to do anything based on 
the referendum, it would still satisfy those scholars who believe that directors must have unfettered 
discretion to implement policy. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 48, at 254 (“Where progressives 
have argued that corporate law ought to be reformed to make directors more accountable to 
stakeholders, the mediating hierarchy approach suggests that directors should not be under direct 
control of either shareholders or other stakeholders.”). 
 184. The information would also be useful for outside unions and other employee activists who 
would advocate against the change based on employee preferences. Katherine Stone’s “citizen union” 
covering employee concerns in a certain region might find the information particularly useful. See 
KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING 
WORKPLACE 229 (2004) (“Citizen unions could act at the local and regional level to pressure 
corporations to become good corporate citizens.”). 
 185. See supra Part II.B.4.  
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performance-related pay packages would be restructured to accommodate 
the new system.186 These new packages often would provide benefits to 
managers, such as accelerated vesting of stock options, new options 
packages, or new grants of stock or restricted stock.187 Even base pay may 
be changed to reflect the new corporate culture of the combined entity. 
While directors may be expected to police instances of excessive 
compensation, there are a variety of reasons to doubt their effectiveness. 
First, the directors themselves may be in on the deal. Just as managerial 
reshuffling can lead to payouts, so too can directorial reshuffling. The firm 
may decide to award bonuses to directors as well as managers.188 Second, 
directors may already feel beholden to managers. Top-level executives 
have significant power over the board nomination and reelection process189 
as well as the directorial compensation process.190 Personal ties help 
cement the feelings of loyalty and friendship.191 Third, the merger process 
is so complicated and hurried that directors may focus on the big picture 
and neglect to work through the complicated compensation details. As 
discussed, managers generally turn to the board for approval of these 
transactions at the last minute.192 As they generally do, boards may trust 
that investment bankers, compensation consultants, and other advisors 
have dealt with the compensation issue sufficiently.193 
In the context of a merger or acquisition, shareholders are empowered 
to protect against such compensation themselves by vetoing the proposed 
combination. However, shareholders have to know about the problem in 
 
 
 186. See, e.g., SWISHER, supra note 1, at 178–79 (discussing change from Time Warner to AOL). 
 187. For an extreme example, see Scott Thurm, The ‘I Must Do a Merger’ Bonus, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 6, 2004, at C1 (discussing a CEO bonus that was dependent on the company’s “entry into new 
businesses by means of acquisitions”). 
 188. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 331–33 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing the issues 
surrounding a stock option grant to directors).  
 189. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 36, at 25–27. 
 190. Id. at 27–31 (discussing how top-level managers can financially reward directors). 
 191. Brian G.M. Main, Charles A. O’Reilly III & James Wade, The CEO, the Board of Directors, 
and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 4 INDUS. & CORP CHANGE 
292 (1995). 
 192. See supra Part II.B.5. 
 193. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 36, at 37–39. See also In re Walt Disney Shareholders’ 
Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 704–11 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (discussing the 
process through which Michael Ovitz was hired by Walt Disney in 1995). Although Chancellor 
Chandler ultimately found no breach of the duties of care and good faith in the Ovitz hiring, he 
acknowledged that “the compensation committee met for one hour” to discuss the terms of Michael 
Ovitz’s compensation along with the compensation packages for various Disney employees, 121 stock 
option grants, top-level executive Robert Iger’s employment agreement, and compensation committee 
chair Irwin Russell’s $250,000 reward for negotiating the Ovitz deal. Id. at 708 (emphasis in the 
original). 
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order to police it. Increasingly, shareholder service providers are taking 
steps to police management and inform large institutional shareholders 
about problems or corruption,194 but such services are not complete. We 
are still far from a world in which shareholders are completely informed 
about their firms and have the power and incentives to act on that 
information.195 
Employees are ideally situated to ally with shareholders in an effort to 
police management. Indeed, this already appears to be taking place. Labor 
unions, for example, have become much more involved in traditional 
corporate governance activism.196 In the 1980s, unions were generally 
antagonistic to shareholder concerns and supported anti-takeover tactics 
such as constituency statutes.197 However, unions have increasingly joined 
the side of shareholders in pushing through shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance measures.198 Unions and union-affiliated pension funds have 
promoted anti-takeover measures through shareholder proposals under 
SEC Rule 14a-8.199 “The amazing thing about these union-sponsored 
shareholder proposals,” notes one set of commentators, “is how ordinary 
they are, from the perspective of any institutional investor.”200 
These measures suggest a new role for union activism: an alliance with 
shareholders in an effort to maximize long-term growth for shareholders 
and other stakeholders.201 In particular, unions can use their “monitoring 
advantages to take actions to increase firm value by policing management 
shirking and reducing the agency costs of equity.”202 In addition, unions 
have a greater incentive to monitor management, because “[w]orkers are 
locked into the firm with firm-specific human-capital investments.”203 If 
unions can monitor and credibly relay their information to other 
 
 
 194. See, e.g., Institutional Shareholder Services, http://www.issproxy.com/index.jsp (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2008). 
 195. Lucien A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 
880 (2005) (“Unlike management, shareholders do not have access to inside, private information.”); 
Larry Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1431, 1467 (2006) (“[E]ven institutional shareholders face obstacles in managing details of each firm 
in their portfolios.”). 
 196. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: 
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998). 
 197. Id. at 1036. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Examples include efforts to remove poison pills and repeal classified boards. See id. at 1045–
46. 
 200. Id. at 1045. 
 201. Id. at 1090. 
 202. Id. As Schwab and Thomas note, unions have “special monitoring abilities” given their 
closeness to the firm and their access to employee information. Id. at 1036. 
 203. Id. at 1037. 
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shareholders, their role in current corporate governance processes will 
only expand.204 
However, the overwhelming majority of employees do not have union 
representation.205 For them, there is no institution to play the role that 
unions play in receiving and channeling employee information. The 
referendum would provide employees with the opportunity to express 
themselves collectively on an issue of corporate governance. The 
referendum results, along with the information generated by those results, 
would inform shareholders and board members about collective employee 
concerns. Employees would have the incentive and the ability to express 
concerns about managerial overreaching.  
The referenda thus offer the opportunity for employees to join with 
shareholders in policing management opportunism. Unlike directors, 
employees do not have the complications that can often muffle complaints 
about executive overreaching.206 And, unlike shareholders, employees are 
immersed in the firm and are more likely to know about managerial 
misconduct. Employees could vote against a transaction on the grounds 
that the compensation packages for managers were too rich and 
undeserved.207 Although this signal would have no binding ramifications, 
it would highlight a problem that shareholders could address in their 
binding vote on the matter. 
In addition, employees themselves may have ownership interests in the 
company. An employee may be invested in her company in a variety of 
forms. The employee might buy stock independently. A more common 
scenario involves employee purchases of company stock through a 401(k) 
plan. Recent reports suggest that thirty to forty percent of the assets of 
401(k) plans that offer an employer stock fund are invested in that fund.208 
In fact, lower-wage workers are more likely to be heavily invested in their 
company’s stock.209 But employees may also have ownership interests that 
 
 
 204. Id.  
 205. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 206. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 196, at 1038 (“[O]utside directors who are CEOs of another 
corporation may be unwilling to raise serious questions about executive compensation for fear of 
having the spotlight turned on their own pay one day.”). 
 207. Employees may need required disclosure of this information in order to monitor it. However, 
it is also possible that this information might leak out, even without mandatory disclosure. 
 208. Susan J. Stabile, I Believed My Employer and Didn’t Sell My Company Stock: Is There an 
ERISA (or ’34 Act) Remedy for Me?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 385, 385 (2004). Stabile has criticized this 
underdiversification and has suggested efforts to remedy it. See id.; Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to 
Choose Unwisely: Congress’ Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own 
Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361 (2002). 
 209. Susan J. Stabile, Another Look at 401(k) Plan Investments in Employer Securities, 35 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 543 (2002). Employers may also match employee contributions with their 
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do not provide the traditional shareholders’ rights. Stock options provide 
another way for employees to have ownership in the company but do not 
provide a right to vote. The purpose of the stock option is to encourage 
employees to think like owners.210 Millions of employees receive stock 
options, and thus have similar incentives to shareholders, but do not have a 
vote on corporate combinations.211 
The employee referendum thus gives more power to the shareholders 
by increasing the odds that they can use their vote as an effective curb 
against managerial opportunism. Shareholder proponents have lamented 
the weakness of shareholder protections.212 A nonbinding employee 
referendum gives shareholders the benefits of employee information with 
essentially no strings attached. Shareholders may accept or reject 
employees’ judgments depending on their own independent analysis, but 
they will benefit from the additional set of monitors that the referendum 
puts in place when it comes to corporate combinations. These monitors 
will have an incentive to work with shareholders, since they have no 
power acting on their own. And they have common ground: the desire to 
prevent managerial overreaching. Indeed, this concern may explain why 
firms have not voluntarily conducted referenda in the past; managers may 
have been afraid of precisely this result. 
If employees vote against a merger because of a particular concern 
about management, managers have the opportunity to correct this problem 
before shareholders vote on the transaction. This happens, from time to 
time, without the referenda; for example, in the merger between the 
MONY Group and AXA Financial, MONY postponed a shareholder vote 
and cut $7.4 million out of executive pay packages in response to 
shareholder concerns about excessive compensation.213 With employees 
on the scene who are able to express themselves, there is a greater chance 
that managerial opportunism would be caught and brought to the attention 
of shareholders. Knowing this, management would be more likely to curb 
opportunism, both ex ante (before the referendum) and ex post (between 
the referendum and the shareholders’ vote). 
 
 
own contributions of company stock. Howell E. Jackson, To What Extent Should Individual Investors 
Rely on the Mechanisms of Market Efficiency: A Preliminary Investigation of Dispersion in Investor 
Returns, 28 J. CORP. L. 671, 680 n.16 (2003). 
 210. Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and Rule 10b-5, 
88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548 (2003). 
 211. Id. at 541. 
 212. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 195. 
 213. Jonathan Stempel, MONY Delays AXA Merger Vote, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2004), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64919-2004Feb23.html.  
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The employee referendum could be just one part of the new coalition 
between shareholders and employees to discipline top-level management. 
Regardless, the referendum provides shareholders with a way to tap into 
inside knowledge for their own benefit. This change will strengthen the 
use of the shareholder franchise.214 For this reason, assuming the referenda 
costs are low,215 shareholder primacists should welcome the addition of the 
nonbinding employee referendum to the corporate law framework. 
III. REFERENDUM AS VOICE 
The employee referendum is a way for employees to communicate 
their opinions about the wisdom of a proposed corporate combination. 
This communication is beneficial not merely for its instrumentality in 
increasing in the flow of information about the transaction. These 
referenda would also give employees a chance to voice their concerns in a 
systematic and public manner. The vote itself—the chance to be heard—
has important benefits beyond the derivative information gains. 
This Part discusses the benefits of giving employees a voice in the 
corporate transaction. It starts with the basic sense of satisfaction and 
utility that employees would derive from the vote itself. It then discusses 
the improvements in employee performance and compliance with 
institutional norms that come from the chance to participate. Finally, the 
Part discusses how improving the civic life of the firm may lead to 
improved civic life in society more generally. 
A. Employee Satisfaction 
In their landmark study of the state of employee perceptions, Richard 
Freeman and Joel Rogers undertook “the most extensive analysis of 
American worker attitudes toward workplace relationships and power in 
more than twenty years.”216 Using focus groups and telephone surveys of 
over 2400 employees, the Worker Representation and Participation Survey 
(WRPS) sought an unbiased look into the concerns of American 
 
 
 214. Cf. Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder 
Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 263–64 (2001) (discussing the 
importance of shareholder self-governance in the overall structure of the corporation). 
 215. See infra Part IV. 
 216. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 12, at 3. 
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workers.217 The stakes were sufficiently high that management and labor 
groups fought over the framing of the study and its results.218 
According to the WRPS, workers have one primary concern at the 
workplace: a desire for more voice. As Freeman and Rogers summarized, 
“American workers want more of a say/influence/representation/ 
participation/voice (call it what you will) at the workplace than they now 
have.”219 The study found that employees wanted greater participation 
because of the improvement to their own working lives as well as the 
improvement to the productivity and success of their company.220 They 
wanted not only voice individually but collectively as well—particularly 
on issues that affected the workers as a group.221 Workers wanted their 
participation to be cooperative with management and believed that 
management resistance was the primary reason they did not have more 
voice within the firm.222 
Although the WRPS focused on workers’ involvement in employee-
related issues, it found evidence that workers wanted a voice in higher-
level company concerns as well. The study found that over half of the 
workers surveyed worked at a company that had a program for employee 
involvement, and thirty-one percent of employees participated in these 
programs.223 A substantial number of these employees reported that their 
employee-involvement committees discussed issues of corporate 
direction.224 Overall, however, eighty-two percent of employees who 
participated in employee-involvement programs believed that giving 
employees a greater say in these programs would make the programs more 
effective.225 This is consistent with the WRPS’s findings that workers want 
more of a voice. 
The notion that employees want more of a voice is consistent with a 
growing number of findings relating to overall satisfaction in a variety of 
circumstances. These findings show that humans want more than simply a 
satisfactory outcome; they also place great importance on a satisfactory 
process. The “procedural justice” school of social psychology has 
 
 
 217. Id. at 3, 17–38. 
 218. Id. at 25–27. 
 219. Id. at 4. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 4–5. 
 222. Id. at 5. 
 223. Id. at 92. 
 224. Id. at 102 (noting that twenty-four percent of employees who participated in long-term 
committees discussed issues of corporate direction). 
 225. Id. at 113. 
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emphasized the importance of process to individual satisfaction and 
utility.226 According to research, individuals look to a number of factors in 
determining whether a decision making process is procedurally just.227 The 
decision maker’s impartiality, honesty, and integrity are critical 
components, as are the opportunity to appeal and the quality of the 
decision. But another critical component is voice: more specifically, 
having some representation within the decision making process. Indeed, 
the importance of voice is evidenced by “one of the most reliable findings 
in research on procedural justice: that people react more favorably to 
procedures that give them considerable freedom in communicating their 
views and arguments.”228 
The employee referendum is an opportunity for employees to 
participate in the process of corporate combinations. As constructed, the 
current process affords no room for employee voice. The ball passes from 
top-level management to the board to the shareholders without any formal 
method for employees to express their opinions. At best, employees may 
voice their opinions to each other, to their supervisors, or to the media. 
Such opportunities are interstitial, sporadic, and uncertain. Moreover, they 
offer no collective opportunity for employees to exercise judgment on the 
proposed transaction. By denying employees a voice in the process, 
corporations and corporate law reduce employee satisfaction with the 
outcome, regardless of its distributive favorability.229 
Early procedural justice theorists argued that voice and representation 
were important for the effect these had on the ultimate outcome of the 
 
 
 226. Economics and its “rational actor” model of human behavior have tended to focus on the 
utility of actual outcomes in determining overall human satisfaction. Procedural justice theorists, on 
the other hand, believe that the process whereby that outcome was reached is also critical in 
determining satisfaction with that outcome. One example of this phenomenon is dissatisfaction with 
dispute resolution procedures even when the dispute is resolved in one’s favor. In one study, those 
who challenged parking tickets were found to be upset with the court’s procedures, even though their 
cases were dismissed. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 2 (1988) (discussing an earlier study). Procedural justice research has focused generally on the 
influence of such concerns on processes of dispute resolution. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & 
Matthew T. Bodie, The Effects of Jury Ignorance About Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1389–90 (2005) (“Procedural justice effects have been found in a 
variety of legal contexts, including with juries, police, mediators, and other government authorities.”). 
However, procedural justice is an issue whenever groups or organizations must make decisions. 
 227. See Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used By Citizens to Assess the 
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 128–31 (1988). 
 228. LIND & TYLER, supra note 226, at 9. But see Bainbridge, supra note 145, at 702–04 (arguing 
that employees have widely varying tastes for participation). 
 229. For an earlier discussion of the importance of procedural justice to the workplace, see 
Marleen A. O’Connor, A Socio-Economic Approach to the Japanese Corporate Governance Structure, 
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529, 1546–56 (1993). 
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procedures.230 Participation in the process was not important in and of 
itself, but rather for its instrumental effects. This theory, known as the 
“control model,” had significant effects on the development of procedural 
justice scholarship.231 However, a growing body of literature suggests that 
voice is not solely important for its effect on the process. Rather, voice is a 
noninstrumental value. This alternative approach, known as the “group-
value” model, argues that expression of one’s view is important without 
reference to the impact on the outcome.232 Instead, “[t]he opportunity to 
present one’s views enhances procedural justice judgments in and of 
itself.”233 These findings confirm what is probably intuitive: we appreciate 
the opportunity to make ourselves heard during decision making processes 
simply for that opportunity.  
These findings have important ramifications for the notion of a 
nonbinding employee referendum. One criticism of the proposal would be 
that employees would not care about the opportunity simply to express 
themselves. Because management and shareholders are free to ignore the 
employees’ vote, the vote may seem meaningless and trivial. But 
procedural justice findings indicate that the vote would have value just as 
an opportunity for employees to express their views. Communicating their 
views and arguments is itself a benefit.234 
In researching the reasons why voice is a noninstrumental value, social 
psychologists have found that the opportunity to participate has important 
ramifications for a group’s self-valuation. This model, known as the 
relational model of authority, finds that “people are concerned with those 
aspects of procedures that convey information to them about their status in 
their group.”235 A just process communicates to those involved that they 
have importance and worth to the decision makers. In a study of 404 
employees from a variety of employment settings,236 Tom Tyler and 
Steven Blader found strong support for the relational model of authority. 
Overall, the study found that employees’ concerns about procedural justice 
 
 
 230. See, e.g. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS (1975); TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 90–91 (2000) (discussing the control 
model). 
 231. TYLER & BLADER, supra note 230, at 91. 
 232. Id. at 91. 
 233. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 226, at 215. 
 234. Id. 
 235. TYLER & BLADER, supra note 230, at 91–92 (citing Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A 
Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADV. IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCH. 115, 175–76 
(1992)). 
 236. Id. at 18. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007] NONBINDING EMPLOYEE REFERENDA 917 
 
 
 
 
exceeded their concerns about distributive justice and outcome 
favorability.237 Looking at what employees found most important in 
assessing the fairness of their workplaces, Tyler and Blader found that 
concerns relating to status recognition and neutrality were significantly 
more important than employees’ ability to exercise control over their 
workplace or the likelihood of favorable outcomes.238 To the employees in 
the study, conceptions of fairness were based more on the relational norms 
evidenced by certain procedures, and less on their power to take part in the 
actual decision making. 
These findings suggest that the employee referendum would provide 
employees greater satisfaction by providing employees with a higher level 
of recognition and status. Giving employees a formalized role in the 
process would demonstrate that they are valued members of the 
community entitled to participate. Even if they had no control over the 
process, and even if the end result were a disadvantageous combination to 
workers, having a role in the process would provide employees with a 
greater sense of fairness and greater satisfaction with their workplace. 
Combined with the informational benefits that the referenda would 
provide to shareholders and directors, the referenda proposal is a win-win-
win for all three of the primary groups involved. 
Of course, it may seem unsettling that employees could be satisfied 
with a largely symbolic role, rather than actual decision making power. In 
fact, the larger notion that people care more about looking important than 
being important suggests the possibility for manipulation or fraud. 
Procedural justice theorists have described this phenomenon as the “false 
consciousness problem.”239 In one study, for example, an opportunity to 
voice one’s opinion about a decision maker’s verdict led to an increase in 
the perception of fairness even when there was no chance of even 
influencing the decision.240 The authors noted that this could lead people 
to believe that the process was fair “even though, by objective criteria, it 
 
 
 237. Id. at 83 (“Thus, we have strong empirical evidence that people’s concern with the fairness of 
group processes exceeds their concerns about what they garner via their group membership . . . .”). 
 238. Id. at 92–96 & tbls. 8-1, 8-2 & 8-3. 
 239. LIND & TYLER, supra note 226, at 4; see also Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control and 
Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness 24 (Cntr. for the Study of Law & Soc’y 
Faculty Working Papers, Paper 30, 2005), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/csls/fwp/30 
(discussing how procedural justice theorists need to spend more time on the “dark side” of procedural 
justice). 
 240. See E. Allan Lind, Ruth Kanfer & P. Christopher Earley, Voice, Control and Procedural 
Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990). 
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[was] patently unfair.”241 An employee referendum could fool employees 
into thinking that their votes mattered when, in actuality, they did not. 
Given employees’ propensity to overestimate the power of their legal 
rights,242 the referendum may be a tool of keeping employees in the dark 
while extracting valuable information and postcombination acquiescence. 
This is an overreaction. Employees should know full well that the vote 
is not binding on the company, and it would not be in management’s 
interest to encourage such a belief. After all, if the referendum defeated the 
combination but went through anyway, the legal reality would hit home. 
To the extent that management pretended to be interested in the 
referendum but did not really care, that expression of concern might be 
valuable in and of itself to employees. Even if merely symbolic, an 
expression of employees’ importance to the firm is useful and meaningful. 
Ultimately, a symbolic expression not only has its own meaning, but over 
time it can deepen into a stronger current between management and 
employees. By establishing a mandatory procedure, the referendum 
proposal provides employees with a voice in the process that upgrades 
their status within the group. This increase in the procedural justice of the 
workplace not only improves the lot of workers, but more importantly has 
further benefits for the firm and society.  
B. Employee Performance and Compliance 
Providing employees a voice in the corporate combination process 
would give them a greater sense of fairness and procedural justice with 
regard to that process. In addition, however, workers who perceive that 
their workplaces are more procedurally just are more likely to work 
cooperatively, follow the firm’s leadership, and comply with ethical 
guidelines. 
Getting employees to work cooperatively—that is, to work together for 
the good of the company—is an essential component to successful 
business. As self-interested actors, individuals generally place their own 
needs above the needs of others. However, in working for a firm, 
individuals are asked to engage in joint productive activity, in which the 
 
 
 241. Id. at 955.  
 242. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker 
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 155 (1997) (offering 
evidence that “workers systematically overestimate their legal protections against arbitrary and unjust 
discharge”); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal 
Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 448 (1999) (concluding that workers “do not really distinguish 
between informal norms and enforceable legal rights”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007] NONBINDING EMPLOYEE REFERENDA 919 
 
 
 
 
gains may not be easily partitionable between members. The notion that 
firm members must provide individualized investments in exchange for 
uncertain and nonseparable returns has been referred to as the “team 
production” problem.243 Although corporate law scholars have focused on 
agency-cost theory in discussing the purpose of the firm, some theorists 
consider the puzzle of team production to be more important in explaining 
the law’s function.244 
Recent scholarship has focused more specifically on the role of law in 
fostering or impeding the development of cooperative relationships within 
the firm. The need to develop cooperative behavior through trust may 
explain such corporate-law doctrines as the duty of care in the face of the 
business judgment rule, the mandatory nature of the duty of loyalty, and 
problems with closely held corporations.245 Yet trust may be highly 
dependent on the social context.246 Certain seemingly irrelevant 
provisions, such as the duty of care, can have important representational 
and relational power in fostering trust amongst members of the 
corporation. Scholars have argued that failure to take trust into account can 
have deleterious consequences to a firm or to society as whole.247 Such 
observations are backed up by extensive social science findings about the 
importance of group cooperation.248 
Perceptions that a process or institution is procedurally just have been 
shown to lead to increased cooperative behavior.249 In their study of 
employees, Tyler and Blader found that procedural justice assessments 
were more likely to predict discretionary cooperative group behavior—
such as complying with work rules and norms, exerting full effort to get 
the job done, deferring to organizational authority, and going beyond job 
responsibilities to help others at the job—than were the employees’ 
 
 
 243. Blair & Stout, supra note 48. 
 244. See, e.g., id. at 249–50, 271. 
 245. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations 
of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1737–45 (2001). 
 246. Id. at 1768–77. 
 247. Id. at 1807–10; see also Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing 
Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 954–57 
(1993) (discussing the importance and fragility of trust in the workplace and proposing methods to 
sustain it). 
 248. See, e.g., TYLER & BLADER, supra note 230, at 23 (“It would be hard to overemphasize the 
importance of the level and type of cooperative behavior engaged in by group members in shaping the 
extent to which groups can function efficiently, effectively, and ultimately, successfully.”). 
 249. See Dennis W. Organ & Katherine Ryan, A Meta-Analytic Review of Attitudinal and 
Dispositional Predictors of Organizational Citizenship Behavior, 48 PERSONNEL PSYCH. 775, 791–95 
(1995) (showing a robust correlation between job satisfaction, perceptions of firm fairness, and 
organizational citizenship behavior). 
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perceptions of distributive justice or outcome favorability.250 Research has 
also linked perceptions of procedural justice with other attitudes and 
behavior that are supportive and beneficial to the firm as a whole. 
Individuals are less likely to leave a group and are more committed to their 
group or organization when they perceive the group to be procedurally 
just.251 They are more likely to perceive the institution as acting 
legitimately.252 Ultimately, a whole host of behaviors beneficial to the firm 
correspond to the procedural justice of the firm. As Tyler and Blader note: 
These results suggest that we know a considerable amount about 
how to encourage the types of cooperative behavior that are central 
to the effectiveness of groups. We can do so by creating structures 
that enact decision-making processes in ways that group members 
will experience as fair.253 
Happiness with the fairness of the process leads to happiness with the 
outcome itself, which leads to greater acceptance of the outcome. One of 
the most robust findings about procedural justice is that individuals are 
more likely to comply with those outcomes (both in experimental and in 
real-world settings) that they perceive as procedurally just.254 Procedural 
justice judgments have been found particularly important to adherence to 
an agreement over time.255 Much of this research has focused on responses 
to judicial or other dispute resolution procedures, but it applies as well in 
the context of group decision making. 
This research supports a common sense notion: workers are likely to do 
a better job if they believe their workplace treats them fairly and wants 
their input.256 As discussed above, these results do not ride in ultimate 
 
 
 250. TYLER & BLADER, supra note 230, at 33, 80–85 & tbl.3-1. 
 251. Id. at 79 (citing ten different studies). 
 252. Id. (citing four studies). 
 253. Id. at 87. 
 254. LIND & TYLER, supra note 226, at 81–82 (discussing experimental support); ROBERT J. 
MACCOUN ET AL., ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE 
ARBITRATION PROGRAM 62 (1988), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2007/R3676.pdf 
(same); Katherine M. Kitzmann & Robert E. Emery, Procedural Justice and Parents’ Satisfaction in a 
Field Study of Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 553, 564 (1993) 
(discussing results from field study); E. Allan Lind, Jerald Greenberg, Kimberly S. Scott & Thomas D. 
Welchans, The Winding Road from Employee to Complainant: Situational and Psychological 
Determinants of Wrongful Termination Claims, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 557, 575–76, 580–81 (2000) 
(same); E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness 
as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 224, 235–36, 240–41, 243 (1993) (same). 
 255. Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 313, 324–
25 (1993); Dean G. Pruitt et al., Goal Achievement, Procedural Justice, and the Success of Mediation, 
1 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 33, 42 (1990). 
 256. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 147, at 213 (“Similar results from both experimental and 
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control over the actual outcomes or even the value of those outcomes. An 
employee referendum would provide employees with a way of 
participating in the transforming transaction. As a result, it would lead to 
better cooperation and compliance within the workplace.257 
C. Social Capital 
In her recent book Working Together, Cynthia Estlund discusses the 
importance of workplace interaction to democratic life in a civil society.258 
In her view, “[t]he workplace is the single most important site of both 
cooperative interaction and sociability among adult citizens outside the 
family.”259 The focus of Estlund’s book is the workplace’s role in creating 
bonds between individuals from different racial, ethnic, and religious 
groups as well as between men and women. However, her insights on the 
role of the workplace as an institution for civic life have important 
ramifications for this Article’s referendum proposal. 
Estlund argues that the workplace is a critical institution for the 
reinvigoration of civic life. Citing the recent literature on “social 
capital,”260 Estlund demonstrates that social capital is “linked to an array 
of social goods, including greater prosperity, health and well-being, safe 
neighborhoods, and better government.”261 She argues, however, that 
social capital theorists have lamented the decline of civic institutions while 
overlooking the role of the workplace in fostering greater social capital. In 
 
 
empirical studies show that allowing people to make decisions about their own working conditions 
often makes a material difference in how they perform.”). 
 257. A sense of procedural justice gives employees more than a greater esprit de corps within the 
institution. Social science research suggests that employees are also more likely to follow the law and 
external ethical norms if they believe their workplace follows fair procedures. See Tom R. Tyler, 
Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings: The Value of Self-
Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287, 1308 (2005) (finding that “people will comply with 
and, more strikingly, voluntarily defer to rules when they feel that their organization’s rule-making 
authorities are following fair procedures when they exercise their authority and make managerial 
decisions”). 
 258. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A 
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY vii (2003). 
 259. Id. at 7. 
 260. See id. at 114 (defining social capital as “‘connections among individuals—social networks 
and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them’ and that help people to 
accomplish things together” (quoting ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND 
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000))). See also Deborah A. DeMott, Trust and Tension 
Within Corporations, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1308, 1309 (1996) (discussing the role of law in creating 
circumstances that “tend to facilitate or discourage productive association among people”). 
 261. ESTLUND, supra note 258, at 115 (citing PUTNAM, supra note 260). 
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Estlund’s view, “the workplace [is] a central site of social capital building 
in contemporary society.”262 
If Estlund is correct, then the employee referendum could be an 
important way of encouraging and developing social capital amongst 
employees. As discussed above, employee referenda would foster a 
climate of greater procedural justice, leading to greater cooperation and 
trust within the firm.263 In essence, greater procedural justice has been 
shown to lead to greater social capital within the firm. In addition, part of 
social capital is so-called “‘civic skills’—skills of communication, 
compromise, and collective decisionmaking, and a sense of political 
efficacy.”264 As an exercise in corporate democracy, the referendum would 
facilitate the development of these skills. Estlund makes an eloquent plea 
for the importance of workplace discussions to the realm of public 
discourse.265 Arguing that the workplace is “a leading site of public 
discourse,” Estlund describes how at the workplace, employees practice 
their deliberation skills, discuss topics of national importance, and reach 
across family and neighborhood boundaries.266 The employee referendum 
would facilitate all of these, in a forum that allows for direct participation 
on an issue of importance to the entire workforce. 
Moreover, the employee referendum would mitigate some of the 
concerns that social theorists have about the workplace as an institution of 
civic life. For example, theorists are concerned with the instrumental and 
hierarchical context in which managers can rule the workplace.267 Estlund 
herself recognizes that “[t]o the extent that the workplace is a major site 
for the formation of social capital, it contributes very unequal portions of 
those assets to individuals and groups at different rungs of the 
socioeconomic ladder.”268 She counters that “[t]hese concerns are 
mitigated but not dissolved by trend towards greater collaboration and less 
rigid hierarchies in the workplace.”269 The referendum is an opportunity 
for collaboration and equality: all get to vote, and each vote has the same 
weight. It would thus mirror the democratic institutions that social 
theorists are hoping to nurture. 
 
 
 262. Id. at 116. 
 263. See supra Part III.B. 
 264. ESTLUND, supra note 258, at 116. 
 265. Id. at 118–23. 
 266. Id. at 118–19. 
 267. Id. at 117. See also Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace 
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 764–65 (1994). 
 268. ESTLUND, supra note 258, at 117. 
 269. Id. 
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There is another way in which benefits from employee referenda may 
spill out beyond the firm and into the public at large. These referenda may 
serve to reinvigorate the discussion about possible new channels for 
employee-firm relations across society.270 In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, when states were passing corporate “constituency” statutes, some 
believed that the statutes were important simply for their symbolic 
value.271 As one commentator argued: 
[T]he fact that half of the states have enacted legislation that 
recognizes that employees are stakeholders in their firms is an 
important event, if only for its symbolic value. The very enactment 
of such statutes suggests that employees’ interests are beginning to 
receive serious attention in the public mind. It therefore suggests the 
possibility that effective means of protecting them can be developed 
in the future.272 
As I have argued above, I believe that employee referenda would have 
substantial informational and participatory benefits to employees. But they 
would also have a symbolic meaning to the public at large: employees 
matter. The referendum is not intended to be a “camel’s nose under the 
tent” leading to a binding employee referendum down the road. It is 
instead one piece of a new approach to employer-employee relations that 
will recast those relations for a new century. The referendum proposal may 
stimulate other ways in which relations between managers, directors, 
shareholders, and employees can be restructured for the greater fairness 
and efficiency of corporate law and society as a whole. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
Parts II and III of this Article discussed the benefits in implementing a 
system of nonbinding employee referenda for corporate combinations. 
This Part concerns the costs of implementation. There are a myriad of 
ways of setting up a system of referenda, but such a system will inevitably 
impose some costs on businesses. Employees must register their votes, and 
then the firm must tabulate and announce the results. These processes use 
employee time and firm resources. These costs must be weighed against 
the benefits in deciding the wisdom of implementing the plan. Below are 
 
 
 270. Cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 
(2002). 
 271. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 181. 
 272. Id. at 71. 
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some initial thoughts on how the referenda could be constructed to keep 
costs as low as possible while still retaining the key elements. 
A. Bright-Line Rules 
In order to keep the process as straightforward as possible, the 
legislation should be crafted to match up with bright-line rules that firms 
could easily follow in holding the referenda. First, the definition of 
“employee” is a source of some controversy, as temporary employees, 
employees of subcontractors, and independent contractors all may be 
considered “employees” depending on the statute or state common law in 
question.273 In order to ease administration, firms could count as 
employees those workers whom they count as employees for tax 
purposes.274 Both the company and the IRS are likely to keep accurate and 
up-to-date records of a company’s employees. Introducing a different 
standard is likely to cause further confusion and delay. 
In addition, states should set a flexible but easy-to-calculate timeline 
for holding the vote. There must be enough time after the announcement 
for employees to process and share information about the transaction, but 
it must provide enough time before the shareholder vote to allow for 
shareholders and directors to respond to the results.275 Perhaps the 
proposal could require that the referendum not be held less than thirty days 
after the announcement, but the referendum’s results must be announced at 
least thirty days prior to the shareholder’s vote. If the latter requirement 
were not followed, shareholders would have the right to petition a court 
for a delay in the vote in order to meet the thirty-day period.276 
Finally, states may wish to require that corporations disclose certain 
material facts to employees prior to the vote. Under state and federal law, 
shareholders are already entitled to significant disclosures prior to their 
proxy vote.277 In order to simplify this process, states could mandate that 
 
 
 273. Compare Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (discussing the 
common-law control test for employee status), with Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534–
35 (1987) (discussing the “economic realities” test under the Fair Labor Standards Act). See STONE, 
supra note 184, at 67–86 (discussing the changing nature of employment). 
 274. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 3306, 3121, 3401–04 (2006) (defining employees for purposes of federal 
taxes). 
 275. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2007) (providing that shareholders must receive proxy 
materials at least twenty days before the vote). 
 276. The right would be akin to shareholders’ rights to call an election if the corporation has failed 
to hold one. See id. § 211(c). 
 277. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2000) (federal disclosure requirements); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a–3, 
–101 (Schedule 14A) (2007) (same); Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp., Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 
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employees receive the same set of disclosures as shareholders. If the 
corporation were permitted to make the same set of materials available to 
employees electronically, the additional disclosure requirements would 
impose few additional costs on the company. 
B. Distribution and Election Costs  
Beyond these bright-line rules, companies should have considerable 
flexibility in establishing the process through which employees would 
vote. This flexibility would enable companies to experiment with the 
process and develop the most cost-effective means of processing the votes. 
The cost of running an employee referendum might initially seem 
comparable with the costs of conducting elections over shareholder 
proposals, which have been estimated at $87,000 per proposal.278 
However, $37,000 of that is estimated as expense for deciding whether to 
include the proposal or not.279 As for the $50,000 in printing, distribution, 
and tabulation costs, the total would be substantially smaller for an 
employee referendum. Because the company has a direct connection to its 
employees, it can use interoffice means to distribute the materials. 
Electronic distribution could provide even greater savings. Similarly, the 
vote need not be conducted at polling stations with paper ballots during 
work hours; instead, the company could use a website to collect and tally 
the votes. As internet access continues to grow and expand across the 
population, the ability to coordinate the distribution of information 
together with the actual voting will mean fairly low costs for conducting 
the employee referendum online.280  
 
 
(Del. 1994) (state disclosure requirements); Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778–79 (Del. 1993) 
(same). 
 278. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40018, 67 
SEC Docket 373, 388 (June 15, 1998) (describing eighty firms reporting on proposal inclusion 
determination costs and sixty-seven reporting on printing and other direct costs). Robert Romano has 
thus argued that limiting or eliminating shareholder proposals could save companies over a billion 
dollars. Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism 
of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 248 (2001) (“The savings to firms from 
eliminating the subsidy for shareholder proposals that fail to receive at least 40% of the votes ranges, 
across the differing historical capitalization rates, from $1.9 billion to $293 million.”). 
 279. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 278. 
 280. SUROWIECKI, supra note 147, at 207 (noting that “dramatic improvements in information 
technology have made the diffusion of information to large numbers of employees feasible and cost-
effective”). 
 Ideally, the technology would balance the need for a secure ballot with an effort to make sure than 
the firm could not check to see how individual employees voted. This technology has already been 
implemented for employee shareholders, who often receive their proxy materials electronically. See D. 
Craig Norlund, Electronic Dissemination of Disclosure Documents, Practising Law Institute, 
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C. State Law Enactment 
Much has been written about the advantages and disadvantages of our 
state, as opposed to federal, system of corporate law.281 Because mergers 
and acquisitions are controlled by state law, the employee referendum 
makes sense as a creature of state law. It is designed to work within that 
system and be a part of the corporate combination process. Although it 
may, perhaps, be possible to impose such a requirement through federal 
law,282 it would be an overlay on top of a distinct legal regime. And it 
would be subject to criticism as a federal intrusion upon state practices of 
corporate governance. 
Implementing the referenda process through state law has functional 
advantages as well. Since the referendum has not been tried anywhere, it is 
by its very nature an experimental project. In Justice Brandeis’s 
memorable phrase, states serve as “laborator[ies]” of democracy and “try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”283 This notion has come to life in corporate law.284 States could 
implement the referenda in a variety of ways and determine, by looking at 
others, which practices work best.285 
 
 
Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. B0-006E, Jan.–Feb. 1999, at *77 
(“The fastest growing audience for electronic proxy material and annual report distribution is 
employee stockholders.”). Such materials must allow for employee shareholders to vote confidentially 
so as to avoid retaliation for their votes. 
 281. For a recent summary of the literature on corporate law federalism, see Brett H. McDonnell, 
Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L. 99, 103–09 (2004). 
 282. It may be necessary to enact such referenda through federal law if they would otherwise be 
preempted by federal law. The most likely candidate for preemption would be the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRA protects collective activity on the part of workers. See 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 157, 158(a)(1) (2000). If a state were to provide its own remedies for employees who had been 
fired or otherwise discriminated against because of their vote, such remedies might conflict with the 
NLRA’s remedies and thus be subject to preemption. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 
359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959) (holding that states cannot regulate conduct that is at least arguably protected 
or prohibited by the NLRA). However, states have traditionally been given great deference in 
establishing their own systems of corporate governance. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 
462, 477–80 (1977). Given that the vote would be part of the state’s corporate law scheme, state 
corporate law interests should outweigh any potential overlap the referendum has with NLRB 
processes. 
 283. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 284. Romano, supra note 175, at 210. 
 285. Cf. David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294 (2006). Moreover, as corporations 
are governed by their state of incorporation, the experiment’s subjects are free to leave if they wish to 
opt out—the “genius” of American law. ROMANO, supra note 11. This flexibility may ameliorate the 
concerns of those who object to legislative changes to the traditional schema of corporate law. See, 
e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 145, at 704–09 (objecting to a “one-size-fits-all” approach to participatory 
management). 
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CONCLUSION 
In closing, let us revisit the opening quote from the email by Robert 
Hughes to Gerald Levin. In retrospect, the e-mail may be spiteful and 
vindictive, but it is also well founded. The merger with AOL was indeed 
disastrous.286 But the e-mail was written not in January 2000, or even 
2001, but in 2002, well after the initial hopes of the merger had proven 
unfounded. With the benefit of hindsight, Hughes can declaim against the 
combination with effective bitterness. What did he think in 2000? 
This “what if” demonstrates the possibilities for the employee 
referendum. If employees, along with the shareholders, had 
overwhelmingly approved the merger, then it would have been much 
harder for Hughes and those like him to center their anger on the CEO. 
Instead of feeling justifiably vengeful, Hughes might have to look inward, 
first, to see how he and his fellow employees voted. Given the apparent 
stock price boost that the merger seemed to have in store for Time Warner 
shareholders, employees might have voted for the merger to support their 
401(k) and stock-option plans. Having bought into the merger from the 
beginning, perhaps they would have given less resistance to it, which 
would have made the transition smoother and ultimately more successful. 
Or, perhaps employees would have voted against the merger. After-the-
fact accounts bristle with Time Warner employees who were horrified at 
the merger and never thought it would work.287 If they truly were against 
the merger from the start, employees could have put a splash of cold water 
on a process that was all heat and light. Directors, shareholders, and the 
media would have asked why, and would have found business-judgment 
concerns, employee-centered concerns, or managerial-opportunism 
concerns—or all three. These doubts might have led to more questions 
about whether the proposed combination was as good an idea as was 
touted. Even if the merger had gone through, perhaps the company, its 
shareholders, and the media would not have been so optimistic about the 
immediate future, and the subsequent downturn would have been less 
crushing. Moreover, having been given a say in the process, employees 
 
 
 286. It is interesting to note that the two principals behind the merger (Time Warner CEO Gerald 
Levin and AOL CEO Stephen Case) are not only no longer with the company, but have removed 
themselves to the edges of corporate America. See Lillian Ross, Spa Man, NEW YORKER, July 9, 2007, 
at 38 (reporting that Case owns a spa in Arizona called Miraval); Seth Stephenson, The Believer, N.Y. 
MAG., July 16, 2007, at 24, 26 (reporting that Levin is presiding director of Moonview Sanctuary, a 
“holistic healing institute” with a full-time staff of fewer than twenty people).  
 287. See, e.g., MUNK, supra note 69, at 233–34; SWISHER, supra note 1, at 149–50, 178–80. 
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may have been more receptive to the combination and may have worked to 
make it more successful. 
This is speculation. Nonetheless, behind the speculation about this 
particularly ill-conceived merger lies the possibility for a different future. 
Economic, psychological, and corporate law research suggests that 
employees may have the information and the interest in participating 
formally in their company’s decision to combine with another. The 
employee referendum would be a straightforward and meaningful way of 
bringing them into the conversation. 
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APPENDIX 
Proposed changes to Delaware Law 
(Changes to existing statute in bold) 
DEL. CODE ANN. 
TITLE 8 
§ 251. Merger or consolidation of domestic corporations and limited 
liability company 
 . . . 
(new c) At least 30 days after the adoption of the agreement, the 
corporation shall hold a nonbinding referendum in which all 
employees [as defined by state tax law] shall vote on the agreement. 
The results of this referendum must be announced publicly at least 30 
days prior to the holding of the special stockholders meeting in 
subsection (d). 
(c) (new d) The agreement required by subsection (b) of this section 
shall be submitted to the stockholders of each constituent corporation at an 
annual or special meeting for the purpose of acting on the agreement. Due 
notice of the time, place and purpose of the meeting shall be mailed to 
each holder of stock, whether voting or nonvoting, of the corporation at 
the stockholder's address as it appears on the records of the corporation, at 
least 20 days prior to the date of the meeting. The notice shall contain a 
copy of the agreement or a brief summary thereof, as the directors shall 
deem advisable. The notice shall include the results of the employee 
referendum in subsection (c). At the meeting, the agreement shall be 
considered and a vote taken for its adoption or rejection. If a majority of 
the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon shall be 
voted for the adoption of the agreement, that fact shall be certified on the 
agreement by the secretary or assistant secretary of the corporation. If the 
agreement shall be so adopted and certified by each constituent 
corporation, it shall then be filed and shall become effective, in accordance 
with § 103 of this title. 
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